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The nancial crisis of 2007{2009 has highlighted the important role played by money mar-
kets (short-term borrowing and lending markets between banks and bank-like institutions)
in shuing liquidity around the nancial system. Globally, these markets experienced se-
vere stress starting with the 9th of August, 2007. On this date, BNP Paribas suspended
withdrawals from some of its hedge funds invested in sub-prime mortgage-backed securi-
ties due to the inability to mark these assets to market. The result was a freeze in the
market for wholesale funding, most notably, in the market for asset-backed commercial
paper (ABCP), which caused rollover problems for structured investment vehicles (SIV's)
and conduits set up by banks as o-balance sheet vehicles for liquidity and regulatory
arbitrage purposes. As the wholesale funding liquidity dried up, banks took the risk of
assets from SIV's and conduits back on their balance sheets.1 In the period that followed,
inter-bank markets for borrowing and lending also seemed to get adversely aected.
Inter-bank markets are generally the private lender-of-last-resort for banks' short-term
liquidity needs. Lack of adequate liquidity ow through these markets is considered to
have the potential to substantially impair real and nancial sectors. For instance, if
liquidity does not get channeled through the banking system to its most ecient use,
then intermediation to households and corporations could stagnate. Also, central banks'
transmission mechanism for monetary policy could be rendered less eective if its liquidity
provision gets trapped on balance-sheets of some banks instead of lubricating the ow of
credit amongst banks. In turn, central banks may be forced to resort to emergency lending
operations { perhaps at overly attractive terms, against risky collateral, and to parts of
the banking sector not generally accommodated in its operations (as has been witnessed
through a series of liquidity facilities created by the New York Federal Reserve, the Bank
of England, the European Central Bank, and other central banks during the crisis). While
such an outcome can substantially contribute to ex-ante moral hazard in bank risk-taking,
it is also accompanied by the misfortune of laying the burden of monitoring and (at least
some) credit-risk management, away from peer-based inter-bank system on to central
bank balance-sheets.
Our paper is an attempt to understand some of these eects by examining the bank
demand for liquidity and its eect on inter-bank markets during the crisis. We hypothesize
and conrm a precautionary motive to liquidity demand by banks during this period2
and investigate its causal eect on inter-bank rates. Our broad conclusion is that events
unfolding since August 9, 2007 had the eect of increasing the funding risk of banks,
1This was either due to reputational reasons or due to liquidity and credit guarantees that sponsoring
banks had contractually provided to the SIV's and conduits. See Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009).
2Such a motive and its eect on markets and the economy have been mentioned often since the
inception of the crisis. See, for example, Financial Times (FT) 12 August 2007: \Scramble for cash
reects fears for system"; FT 26 March 2008: \Hoarding by banks stokes fear over crisis"; FT 19 May
2008: \Loans to banks limited despite market thawing".
2in response to which banks, especially the weaker ones, hoarded liquidity. Given their
increased opportunity cost of giving up liquidity to other banks, inter-bank rates rose
in both secured and unsecured markets and regardless of counterparty risk of borrowing
banks, suggestive of an interest-rate contagion through the inter-bank market.
Specically, we study the liquidity demand of large, settlement banks in the UK and its
eect on Sterling money markets before and during the sub-prime crisis { from January
2007 till the end of June 2008. We focus on the settlement banks since they can be
considered as the market makers for money. In other words, most payment ows occur
through these banks. Hence, studying their demand for liquidity in response to the risks
they face and how this demand aects market-wide and bank-specic inter-bank rates
provides a natural setting for the questions we wish to answer. We examine bank liquidity
in terms of their reserve balances with the central bank and the price of this liquidity in
terms of the overnight inter-bank rates.
The reserve balances held by banks at a central bank can be understood as their
\checking accounts."3 A bank's portfolio decision involves whether to keep reserves in
the form of liquid balances in its checking account for ready draw down during the day
to meet payment; or, to have illiquid claims by extending own reserves to others in the
economy in the form of loans to households and corporations, to other banks through inter-
bank markets, purchase assets such as mortgage-backed securities, etc. Each nancial
transaction taking place in the economy (for example, a retail depositor withdraws from
ATM or a corporation deposits into a money market fund) involves a \debit" from some
bank's reserve balance and \credit" into another. Not all banks at each point in the
day necessarily have reserves to meet all of their payment activity. Hence, they use the
inter-bank market to exchange reserves and the total nancial activity in the economy
ends up being a large multiplier on the quantity of circulating reserves.
While the aggregate reserves in the economy stay constant (unless altered by the
central bank), by and large a few banks { typically the large ones { play a bigger role
in these transactions and determine the price at which reserves are exchanged in the
inter-bank market. Banks have access to the central bank's discount window to borrow
reserves overnight at a penalty, but such borrowing is associated with the \stigma" that
if borrowing in isolation, a bank might be perceived to be riskier than others, triggering a
run on the bank.4 Thus, in practice, it is often not the central bank's lending rate at the
discount window that ends up determining banks' opportunity cost in lending reserves to
others. Instead, this opportunity cost is determined by the liquidity of asset markets and
wholesale borrowing markets that banks can access to meet their daily requirement of
reserves. During the crisis, these markets got signicantly impaired. We investigate how
this aected the portfolio decision of large, settlement banks in the UK to hold liquidity
3We are grateful to one of our discussants, Arvind Krishnamurthy, for providing this analogy.
4Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar and Shrader (2010) provide compelling evidence of such a stigma attached
to borrowing from the discount window during the nancial crisis of 2007-08.
3in the form of reserves, and in turn, how this aected the price at which they were willing
to extend reserves in the inter-bank market.
Our choice of the Sterling money markets is driven primarily by the fact that the
Bank of England (BoE) monetary policy framework oers an attractive way of measuring
a bank's overnight liquidity as its reserves with the BoE. As we explain in Section 2,
the remuneration oered by the BoE on these reserves (within a band) implies that it
was optimal for banks to park their liquidity in the form of these reserves.5 Further,
under the BoE monetary policy framework, banks are allowed to determine their own
reserves targets at the beginning of each maintenance period (roughly a month), which
the BoE subsequently meets through its open market operations (OMOs). This provides a
strong and direct measure of bank demand for liquidity (what we term as their \overnight
liquidity"), allowing for its separation from uctuations in bank reserves induced due to
supply of reserves by the central bank.6 Finally, since we focus on reserves held by
settlement banks, which form a subset of banks that hold total reserves of the economy,
there are daily shifts in our measure of settlement bank liquidity even when there is no
change aected by the BoE in aggregate reserves in the UK economy.
As our rst piece of evidence, we show that settlement bank liquidity experienced a
signicant upward jump upon the onset of the sub-prime crisis (see Figure 1). Based
on econometric tests for structural breaks, it experienced a 25% increase in the period
immediately starting 9th August, 2007, and a further 15% increase around 13th March,
2008 (the revelation of severe funding problems and ultimately collapse of Bear Stearns).7
As our second piece of evidence, we show that this build up of bank liquidity was
precautionary in nature. First, we verify that settlement banks held more liquidity on
days with greater aggregate volume of payments activity, argued to be days with greater
uncertainty in the activity at individual banks (Furne, 2000). Such response of settlement
5In contrast, the Federal Reserve in the United States did not pay interest on reserves until October
2008 so that bank liquidity over and above the reserves requirement would typically not be parked at the
Federal Reserve.
6We also study \total liquidity" that includes the bank collateral as under \double-duty" this can be
employed for intra-day borrowing from the BoE. This collateral which is held in fulllment of prudential
requirements cannot be used to borrow overnight on the market. Our results are qualitatively similar for
overnight liquidity as well as total liquidity.
7While 9th August, 2007 is recognized by most as a crucial breakpoint that initiated the crisis,
anecdotal evidence also supports the second breakpoint of 13th March, 2008. See, for example, FT 9
April 2008: \UK banks seek higher borrowing facilities", and FT 10 April 2008: \UK banks seek more
BoE borrowing", which noted that \UK banks asked to increase sharply the reserves they hold on deposit
at the Bank this month to the highest ever level amid concerns that the instability of the banking system
could suddenly leave them desperate for cash. They fear another bank crisis - akin to the collapse of US
investment bank Bear Stearns - could see the market seize up. Banks have asked to keep total reserves
of $23.54bn on deposit that they can borrow to meet short-term nancing needs if they cannot borrow
in the interbank market. This is up from the nearly $20bn they had on deposit until yesterday. This is
money the banks keep on deposit at the Bank, earning interest, but that they can access when the cost
of borrowing from other banks becomes too high."
4bank liquidity to payment activity is non-existent in the pre-crisis period. Next, we employ
the bank-level variation in liquidity, funding risk proxies, and economic health during the
crisis. We nd that banks that during the crisis made greater losses (in terms of write-os,
equity price declines and widening of credit default swap spreads), hoarded more liquidity.
Further, these banks also held more liquidity in response to payment uncertainty.
In our third piece of evidence, we study the eect of settlement bank liquidity on
market-wide overnight inter-bank rates. In order to subsume any step-variations induced
by policy changes, we look at spreads of the inter-bank rates to BoE's policy rate. We
obtain overnight secured rates (with the UK government's GILT as collateral), and un-
secured rates from the British Bankers' Association and Wholesale Markets Brokers' As-
sociation. In normal times, the \arbitrage" hypothesis in money markets postulates that
if inter-bank rates become higher than the BoE policy rate, then banks that experience
exogenous rise in their liquidity that day release the liquidity to other needy banks in or-
der to capture the spread. This induces a negative relationship between settlement bank
liquidity and inter-bank spreads. We call this the \arbitrage" eect. Our crucial observa-
tion is that when the rise in liquidity of settlement banks is endogenous, in particular, a
precautionary response to heightened risks and funding concerns, then this relation may
be reversed as they need to be compensated more for releasing liquidity to others. We
call this the \liquidity" eect.
We attempt to separate this dierential eect on inter-bank rates of exogenous and
endogenous components of settlement bank liquidity. We show that the aggregate pay-
ment activity is driven by calendar day eects (for instance, lower on bank holidays in
the United States), and is essentially uncorrelated over time. Thus, a lagged measure
of such activity is a potential instrument for settlement bank liquidity while studying
its eect on inter-bank rates. Formally, inter-bank rates on a given day depend on the
liquidity reserves of settlement banks on that day (measured at 5 am), which we natu-
rally assume includes a component of reserves adjusted to previous day's payment activity
(the instrument) and a component adjusted in anticipation of today's payment activity
(the endogenous component). We conduct a three-stage least squares estimation linking
liquidity to rates and verify the econometric validity of our instrument.
The results reveal a strong causal eect of settlement bank liquidity on inter-bank
rates, but in a manner that diers sharply between pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. When
evaluated at the breakpoints of settlement bank liquidity (August 9, 2007 and March 13,
2008), we nd evidence supportive of the liquidity eect: the eect of (instrumented)
liquidity is to raise overnight inter-bank rates in the period during the crisis. In contrast,
this relationship is signicantly negative in the period prior to the crisis, consistent with
the arbitrage eect of settlement bank liquidity on inter-bank rates. What is striking is
that the eect of settlement bank liquidity on secured rates { in transactions secured by
UK gilts { is as high and signicant as on the unsecured rates.
Finally, we ask if this eect of the endogenous rise in settlement bank liquidity on inter-
5bank rates is uniform for all borrowing banks or limited to those that were aected most
adversely during the crisis. We exploit bank-level variation in the inter-bank unsecured
borrowing rates (using the Furne, 2000 algorithm on the payment ows data) and study
whether it is determined by bank's own liquidity as well as that of other banks.8 We
nd that it is other banks' liquidity that determines a bank's borrowing rate rather than
its own liquidity. And importantly, the group of stronger banks during the crisis is as
exposed to rate rises (in response to other banks' liquidity) as the group of weaker banks.
We interpret these ndings to imply that while the access to capital markets and
wholesale borrowing in commercial paper markets might have been impaired for banks
depending upon their credit risk, overnight Sterling inter-bank rates in the rst year of
the crisis do not seem to have been driven by counterparty risk concerns of lending banks
about the borrowing banks. Instead, the credit risk of banks appears to have manifested in
inter-bank rates through greater lending rates by weaker banks for all borrowing banks.
Put another way, our ndings suggest that the stress in Sterling money markets was
at least partly due to weaker banks engaging in liquidity hoarding as a precautionary
response to their own credit risk and in turn their heightened opportunity cost of funds.
Such hoarding raised borrowing rates for safer banks too, suggestive of a contagion-style
systemic risk operating through inter-bank markets.
Overall, our evidence suggests that regulatory attempts to thaw the money market
stress and reduce variability of inter-bank rates, if successful, can have salubrious eects
on healthier parts of banking (and possibly, the real sector). Our results, however, suggest
that to the extent a part of the stress emanates from liquidity hoardings of banks with
troubled funding and balance-sheet conditions, such thawing should involve addressing
insolvency concerns (for example, early supervision and stress tests, and recapitalization
of troubled banks) and not just provisions of emergency liquidity.
Before proceeding to the remainder of the paper, we stress that our analysis stops in
end of June 2008 (when this paper was initiated). It is no doubt interesting to examine
the period post-June 2008, especially around the collapse of Lehman Brothers. On the
one hand, counterparty risk concerns in inter-bank markets { even at overnight horizons {
are likely to have been a much greater concern for lending banks in this period (as shown
in the Fed Funds market by Afonso, Kovner and Schoar, 2010). On the other hand, a
large number of central bank interventions were already in place by this time to help
banks manage their liquidity better and more were designed within two to four weeks
of Lehman's collapse, rendering it far more dicult to isolate outcomes attributable to
bank behavior rather than to policy responses. Nevertheless, this remains an important
extension that we plan to pursue in future research.
Section 2 provides the relevant institutional details of the UK payment system and
8Such data are not available for secured borrowing rates. However, the simple time-series plots of the
overnight secured and unsecured rates relative to BoE policy rate track each other rather well (see Figure
2).
6money markets. Section 3 documents the regime switch in liquidity reserves of banks and
Section 4 shows that liquidity hoardings of banks have a precautionary aspect to them.
Section 5 establishes the causal eect of liquidity hoardings on inter-bank rates and the
contagion-style results. Section 7 relates our paper to literature and Section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
This section provides some important background information. Section 2.2 provides an
overview of the Bank of England (BoE) monetary policy framework. Section 2.1 describes
the structure of the payment system and money markets in the UK and institutional and
operational boundaries within which banks are able to manage the liquidity requirements
arising from their daily payment activity. Section 6 summarizing the range of adjustments
to the framework the BoE undertook since August 2007 to restore orderly conditions in
money markets is discussed after presenting our main analysis.
2.1 The Monetary Policy Framework9
In May 2007 the BoE was given independence and assigned operational responsibility
of monetary policy to its newly created Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The MPC
meets at least once a month to set the rate of interest. The MPC is responsible for setting
the appropriate rate to meet the set ination target (based on the Consumer Price Index)
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The ination target is 2 per cent, with a 1 per
cent tolerance range. The BoE implements monetary policy by lending to the money
market at the ocial repo rate chosen by the MPC. Eligible assets include gilts, Treasury
bills and other government bonds. Keeping the (secured) overnight market rates close to
the ocial rate is the primary objective. A combination of reserves accounts, reserves
averaging and the standing facility corridor is used to limit volatility in overnight interest
rates over each maintenance period.
37 UK banks and building societies that are members of the reserves scheme set
their \target" balances at the beginning of each maintenance period (Monetary Policy
Committee's decision date until the next) and undertake to hold balances, remunerated
at the ocial Bank rate (or the policy rate), that on average meet the pre-set target over
the maintenance period. Participation in the reserves-averaging scheme is voluntary other
than for the rst-tier, or in other words, the settlement banks, which join the scheme
automatically because their role in the payments system entails them having reserves
9This section relies heavily on "The framework for the Bank of Eng-
land's operations in the sterling money markets (The 'Red Book')" available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2006/054.htm, Clews (2005), various issues of
the Bank of England's Quarterly Bulletin (Q3 2007{Q4 2008), and unpublished notes by Bank of
England sta.
7accounts, and so maintaining balances, with the central bank. If a member's average
balance is within a +/- 1% range around the target (averaging reserves balances at the
end of each calendar day over the maintenance period as a whole), the balance would be
remunerated at the ocial Bank rate. Averaging keeps overnight market interest rates in
line with the ocial Bank rate throughout the maintenance period as it leads banks to
manage their balances actively and continuously arbitrage between running down their
reserves balances or borrowing from the market.
Open Market Operations (OMOs) are used by the BoE to provide the amount of
money needed to enable reserves banks, in aggregate, to achieve their self-determined
reserves targets. Hence, in the BoE monetary policy framework, except for emergency
injections, the aggregate quantity of reserves is a response to the demand of reserves
banks.10 OMOs comprise short-term repos at the ocial Bank rate, long-term repos at
market rates determined in variable-rate tenders, and outright purchases of high-quality
bonds. The BoE accepts as counterparties in its open market operations (OMOs): (1)
banks and building societies eligible to participate in the reserves scheme; and (2) other
banks, building societies and securities dealers authorized under the Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 that are active intermediaries in the sterling markets.
If money markets are disrupted the BoE can increase its lending via OMOs above the
aggregate target chosen by banks, while keeping control of market interest rates by paying
the ocial rate on these larger balances either by increasing reserves targets pro rata or
by widening the range around existing targets.
Standing deposit and (collateralized) lending facilities are also available to eligible
UK banks and building societies and may be used on demand as emergency sources of
nancing. In normal circumstances they carry a penalty, relative to the ocial Bank rate,
of +/- 25 basis points (bps) on the nal day of the monthly reserves maintenance period,
and of +/- 100 basis points on all other days. Their usage, however, is subject to the
\stigma" problem, especially during a crisis, as explained in the introduction (Section 1).
2.2 Structure of the Payment System and Money Markets
There are about 400 active banks in the UK. The UK large-value payment system has
a \tiered" structure. Tiering means that many (usually smaller) second-tier banks do
not settle at the central bank but do so on the accounts of few (larger) rst-tier banks
10The Bank of England Red Book says: \The quantity of central bank money, and equivalently the
size and composition of the Bank's sterling liabilities, is largely demand-determined... The Bank ensures
that its stock of short-term repo lending on Banking Department is always at least as large as aggregate
reserves targets, so that it can adjust the size of its weekly OMOs to oset any change in banks' aggregate
reserves targets or any other sterling ows (so-called autonomous factors) between the banking system
and the Banking Department's balance sheet. Matching aggregate reserves with short-term repo lending
also avoids interest rate exposure on Banking Department as the Bank pays the ocial Bank Rate on
targeted reserves and earns the ocial Bank Rate on its short-term repo lending."
8also referred to as the settlement banks or clearers. 15 banks are direct participants in
the large-value payment system called CHAPS. Two of the direct participants are foreign
owned banks with a narrow retail activity in the UK. In our sample of large, settlement
banks, we exclude these two foreign banks since their liquidity kept in the form of the BoE
reserves underestimates their overall liquidity, possibly substantially. We also exclude the
BoE and the CLS bank (the clearing bank) and the one bank which became a settlement
bank only in October 2008 (outside of our sample period). Hence, we are left with ten
large, settlement banks.
CHAPS is used for business-to-business payments; by solicitors/licensed conveyancers
to transfer the purchase price of a house between the bank accounts of those involved; by
individuals buying or selling a high-value item, such as a car, who need a secure, urgent,
same-day guaranteed payment. Hence most high-value wholesale payments go through
CHAPS. There is, however, no lower limit on transaction values, and the system can
be used for low-value (retail) payments when same-day nality is required. Importantly
however, nancial transactions are not settled through CHAPS but through the securities
settlement system. This explains why the amount of activity in CHAPS has not uctuated
much during the crisis (see Figure 4).
Money markets or inter-bank markets allow participants to manage short-term liquid-
ity positions that arise from their daily payment activity. The tiered structure described
above for the payment system is also reected in money-market activities. The key players
in the Sterling market across all instruments and maturities are the UK clearing banks,
other large UK banks, and large US and European banks. The provision of liquidity
through the system operates via a `top-down' structure. Along the top tier, the big four
`clearers' provide funding horizontally to each other and vertically to other counterparties
(typically building societies and European banks with whom they have an established
relationship). Smaller players are not inclined to provide liquidity horizontally to com-
petitors and instead are more likely to pass it vertically up the system. So below the top
tier, horizontal movement is very limited. Hence, even within our sample of ten settlement
banks, we will sometimes study the top four clearers and compare them with the rest, as
the top clearers are subject to most of the payment uncertainty.
Besides the interbank markets banks manage short-term liquidity needs via their re-
serves balances held at the central bank. Subject to meeting the monthly target balance
and avoiding overnight overdrafts, reserves balances can be varied freely to meet day-
to-day liquidity needs. For example, funds can be moved on and o reserves accounts
up to the close of the payments system in order to accommodate unexpected end-of-day
payment inows and outows. In this way, reserves balances can be used by banks as a
liquidity buer.
Reserves banks can also change their reserves target from month to month in response
to, for example, variations in the size or uncertainty of their payments ows. Settlement
banks can also draw on reserves balances during the day to bridge any gap between
9payments made and expected receipts. For this purpose, holding reserves is an alternative
to borrowing from the central bank during the day against eligible collateral. The routine
provision of intra-day liquidity to settlement banks against eligible collateral together
with reserves balances, provides the necessary lubricant for the working of the Sterling
payments system, ensuring that settlement banks are able to make payments in advance
of expected receipts later in the day. Intra-day lending from the BoE to the settlement
banks is interest-free, but if not reimbursed by the end of the day it entails a large penalty
(not publicly specied in the Bank of England's Red Book describing its monetary policy).
Individual institutions also tend to have plans to manage liquidity in times of stress.
Smaller banks can obtain liquidity insurance from larger banks by paying for committed
lines of credit. But larger banks generally cannot buy insurance from each other without
imposing an unacceptable level of (contingent) counterparty credit risk. Thus, they have
to self-insure, which they do by (i) holding balances on their reserves account at the BoE,
as discussed above; (ii) keeping high-quality assets that can be exchanged for central bank
money in the open market operations (OMOs); and, (iii) through the Bank's standing (or
semantically, emergency) lending facility. We discuss (ii) and (iii) next.
3 Regime Shifts in Settlement Bank Liquidity
We now turn to our rst result which exploits an event study approach to investigating
the settlement banks' liquidity holdings during the crisis.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We measure the settlement banks' overnight liquidity as the sum of the reserves accounts
held by the ten UK rst-tier banks at the central bank and measured at 5 am each day.
Their total liquidity is the sum of their overnight liquidity and their intra-day liquidity.
The intra-day liquidity is the maximum total collateral that these settlement banks post
during a day to obtain intra-day credit from the central bank, including the collateral held
overnight in fulllment of BoE's regulatory liquidity requirement. The data are obtained
from the Bank of England. All data are daily and cover the period 02 January 2007 to
30 June 2008.
The rst two rows of Table 1 report various descriptive statistics (mean, standard
deviation, minimum, maximum, quantiles) of the overnight and total liquidity held by
rst-tier banks. This is reported for the whole sample period along with a test of the
dierence in means between the two sub-periods (pre- and post-August 9th 2007). We
see from the dierence that the overnight liquidity is 27 per cent higher post August
9th and the total liquidity 24 per cent higher. These dierences are also seen in Figure
1 (logarithm of total liquidity) and Figure 3 (overnight liquidity) and are signicant
statistically at the 1% level.
103.2 Event Study
To understand these shifts in banks liquidity without pre-supposing the break points,
we statistically identify the exact periods when settlement banks revised their liquidity
demand and relate these to relevant market news obtained from Bloomberg's real-time
news service. We employ the Bai and Perron (1998) test which estimates the timing
of permanent level shifts in a time series. This method applies a sequential algorithm
that searches all possible sets of breaks and determines for each number of breaks the
set that produces the maximum goodness-of-t. Statistical tests then determine whether
the improved t produced by allowing an additional break is suciently large given what
would be expected by chance (due to noise). We apply the test to the logarithm of total
and overnight settlement bank liquidity in order to mute the eect of outliers (and in
subsequent tests to allow interpretation of coecients in terms of elasticities).
3.2.1 Total Liquidity
Table 2a reports the test results for total liquidity. The rst column reports the break
dates. The second column gives the 95% condence interval for each break point. The
third column provides the estimated mean of the (log) liquidity series considered for each
window. The fourth column details headlines on dates over the period 1 May 2007 to 30
June 2008 falling within the 95% condence interval for any break point shown in bold.
The total liquidity (in logarithm) and estimated breaks are also plotted in Figure 1.
The test identies two upward breaks in the total liquidity. A rst 7.2% increase in the
total liquidity occurred on March 27th 2007 and a further 20% increase on August 8th
2007. The rst break is modest in comparison to the second and does not coincide with
any key market event. In contrast, the second break precedes immediately August 9th
2007, widely believed to be the date of money market \freeze" in the UK, European and
US money markets, and coincides exactly with the rst negative news announcement by
a major European bank (BNP Paribas) in Bloomberg headlines which led to a freeze in
the asset-backed commercial paper market.11
This is preliminary evidence that the most signicant break point in total settlement
bank liquidity series might have been a response to the heightened funding risk as banks
suddenly faced high costs in raising wholesale funding, for example, issuing short-term
asset-backed commercial paper. Instead, banks would now have to tap into other forms
of nancing such as relying more on reserves balances with the central bank or through
11For two weeks in August BNP Paribas suspended redemptions from three money market funds
because they did not feel they could fairly value their positions. Before BNP's announcement, loss
announcements and other negative news in the headlines were concentrated in the United States, primarily
Bear Stearns' hedge funds and also some monoline insurers. A cascade of loss announcements, primarily
unscheduled, from US and European banks followed immediately after BNP's announcement as many
banks were forced to honor the liquidity and credit enhancements they had sold to asset-backed special
purpose vehicles or in some cases take these assets back on balance sheets.
11inter-bank markets or do external capital-raising (which is however especially costly in a
crisis both in terms of adverse selection costs, as argued by Myers and Majluf, 1984, and
dilution costs due to debt overhang, as argued by Myers, 1977).
3.2.2 Overnight Liquidity
Table 2b reports results for the overnight liquidity. The test identies two breaks in the
overnight liquidity. The rst break, a 24% increase in overnight liquidity, occurred around
September 11th 2007. This is one month later than the major break in the total liquidity.
This break is delayed because banks are allowed to revise their reserves targets only
from one Monetary Policy Committee meeting to the next. Figure 3 shows that the rst
increase in the aggregate reserves target occurred on September 6th 2007, the date the rst
MPC meeting took place after the sub-prime crisis took hold. One can observe in Table
2b further increases in the overnight liquidity from mid-September onwards following the
BoE decisions to inject extra liquidity in its regular weekly open market operations (as
described in Section 6). For the October maintenance period, banks chose a higher target
{ around 20% higher than the aggregate target for the August maintenance period.
At the second break, March 13th 2008, rst-tier banks increased their overnight liq-
uidity by an additional 15.5%. The second break coincides exactly with the collapse of
Bear Stearns in the US. Bear Stearns episode reected yet another freeze, this time in
the wholesale market for borrowing secured (\repo") against highly rated asset-backed
securities. Traditionally, banks had always assumed they would be able to access the repo
market for short-term liquidity needs. The Bear Stearns collapse revealed however that
banks could no longer assume in their liquidity stress tests that the worst case scenario
was simply the drying up of unsecured funding, but that secured funding may dry up
too. This further intensied the funding needs and risks faced by banks and the liquidity
response of banks is thus again consistent with a precautionary motive. Note that in con-
trast to the delayed response following August 9th 2007, the liquidity demand of banks
in this case reacted more or less immediately to Bear Stearns' collapse. This was possible
due to the BoE decision on October 4th 2007 to widen the band around target within
which reserves are remunerated from +/-1% to +/-30% (as described in Section 6).12
4 Evidence of the Precautionary Motive
While the higher reserves targets may have reected anticipation of heightened funding
needs and risks, one needs to consider also the fact that banks had access to BoE's standing
12In particular, if there is an upward shock to reserves demand within a maintenance period, the
band widening allowed banks to demand additional reserves without incurring penalty for deviating from
targets, and allowed the BoE to supply additional reserves without needing to drain reserves later in the
maintenance period.
12facilities as an alternative. Hence, the preference for reserves as a way of building liquidity
can also be interpreted as a reduced tolerance for the risk of using BoE's standing facilities,
most likely due to the potential \stigma" of accessing them during period of market
stress. Specically, the marginal benet of an additional unit of reserves is the insurance
it provides against having to use the standing facilities (SF) following an unexpected
payment shock in late trading. The expected cost of using the SF is a function of the direct
penalty in using it (which remained constant or in fact was lowered by the BoE during the
crisis), the indirect penalty due to stigma, and the size of unexpected payment shocks.
This cost must be traded o against the opportunity cost of not deploying elsewhere
an additional unit of reserves, which is typically the spread between policy rate and the
overnight (secured) market rate.
Across maintenance periods, i.e., from one MPC meeting to another, reserves targets
can themselves be varied. However within a maintenance period, settlement banks can
increase their liquidity buer only through other means: by reducing lending to households
and rms, by selling assets or by reducing net lending to second-tier banks. We do not
observe the exact actions taken by banks to vary their liquidity buers. For instance,
lending data are available only for ve of the banks and that too only at monthly frequency.
No data on asset sales are easily available. And lending volumes can be reasonably
imputed at individual bank level only for overnight unsecured lending, but not for secured
and term lending. Nevertheless, we explain below that we can still design empirical tests
that enable inference about the reasons for variation in bank demand for liquidity.
In order to tease the tradeo faced by banks in building up reserves, we examine the
explanatory power of aggregate payment shock uncertainty for settlement bank liquidity
and explore its interaction with bank-level funding risk and balance-sheet condition. That
is, we now investigate the cross-sectional variation in liquidity demand of settlement
banks. From now on our analysis focuses only on overnight liquidity (reserves balances)
which is the settlement liquidity remunerated by the central bank and exchanged in the
interbank market. The results are similar for total liquidity that includes maximum intra-
day borrowing from the Bank of England (but repaid by end of the same day).
4.1 Benchmark specication
Our rst test of the precautionary motive consists of estimating changes in the liquidity
demand of settlement banks in response to changes in aggregate payment activity. The
underlying idea is that on days of high aggregate payment activity, some individual banks
might end up with signicant payment needs but the distribution { that is which individual
banks will face these needs { is uncertain. The data for payment activity are from the Bank
of England payment database. The daily payment activity is measured as the sum of all
transactions that ow through the large-value payment system (CHAPS), net of interbank
loans activity. We use two measures of aggregate payment activity that are also typically
13employed in analysis of money markets: Payment value measuring the Sterling amount
and Payment volume measuring the number of transactions. A higher payment value
controlling for number of transactions implies greater payment risk; conversely, higher
payment volume controlling for payment value implies small size transactions and lower
payment risk.13
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for payment value and volume pre-crisis and
during the crisis. Strikingly, there is virtually no dierence in the economic magnitude of
payment activity by itself over the two periods. This is important for our identication
to follow as any dierential response of settlement bank liquidity to payment activity
must thus arise from a rise in the perceived cost of managing payment shocks through
means other than central bank reserves. Figure 4 plots the payment activity in value
and volume (in logarithm). At rst sight, these series appear to be white noise processes.
A Portmanteau test reported in Table 3 conrms this observation. For both series the
lag-one autoregressive coecients are small (not reported). The Portmanteau test for
lag-one has p-value of 0.29 for the aggregate payment value and 0.12 for the aggregate
payment volume rejecting the null hypothesis that the rst lag autocorrelation is dierent
from zero.
Importantly though, payment risk measured as daily changes in aggregate payment
activity is in fact predictable by banks due to calendar eects. In fact, APACS, the UK
payments association, claim to be able to forecast close to 100 per cent of the uctuations
in aggregate payment ows (not their distribution across banks). Table 3 reports the
eects on aggregate payment activity of a non-exhaustive set of calendar dummies, which
includes holidays in United States and the United Kingdom, and xed eects for day of
the week, quarter, and beginning and end of each month. With these few dummies we are
able to predict 75 per cent of the variation in the payment volume and 40 per cent of the
variation in payment value. Economically important calendar eects are (i) United States
holidays which are associated with a 58 per cent drop in the value of payments activity,
(ii) days around the United Kingdom holidays when there are, for instance, higher than
usual deposit withdrawals; and (iii) fourth quarter eect which is negative also.
To investigate how banks adjusted their liquidity reserves at the start of the day in
response to payment activity measured at the end of the day (which we have shown to
be predictable due to calendar eects), and whether this adjustment diered before and
during the crisis, we estimate the following specication:14










s  Pt  break
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t
13Note that the two are correlated, but not highly so (around 0.5) with not much dierence in the pre-
and during crisis periods.
14For most of the remaining analysis, we focus on the reserves liquidity because only reserves can be
lent overnight in the market. Collateral that may be used for intraday borrowing (under the regime
double-duty) must be held overnight on balance-sheet in fulllment of regulatory liquidity requirements.




s  Xi(t 1)  break
s
t + "t ; (1)
where i stands for a bank subscript, !i is a bank xed eect, OLiqit is the overnight
liquidity of settlement banks, and P is a vector of measures of aggregate payment activity
(the volume and the value). Payment activity is in logarithm and liquidity is in percentage
of a standard deviation variation from the rst half of 2007 average (capturing abnormal
variations in bank liquidity demand). The breaks are based on estimations in Table 2:
break1
t is a post August 8th 2007 dummy; break2
t is a post September 11th 2007 dummy;
break3
t is a post March 13th 2008 dummy.15
Hence, the rst line of the specication allows for a structural break in settlement bank
liquidity at these break points, tests for its sensitivity to aggregate payment activity,
and whether this sensitivity changed around the break points. The second line of the
specication allows for a test of whether settlement bank liquidity was higher for some
banks and more so following the break points. We employ ve specications with dierent
bank characteristics Xi (lagged, wherever applicable), that capture the bank's payment
exposure, funding risk and realized health during the crisis:
1. A dummy variable for whether the bank is one of the top 4 settlement banks in
terms of payment activity.
2. Cumulative write-os scaled by total assets (quarterly series).
3. The % fall in equity market capitalization relative to the average capitalization in
2006 (daily series).
4. The cumulative change in the 5-year senior unsecured (Modied Restructuring
clause) credit default swap (CDS) premium collected from MarkIt (daily series).
5. The cumulative change in the ratio of total assets to retail deposits (monthly series).
The rationale for picking these bank characteristics is as follows. Bigger settlement
banks are exposed to greater risk of payment shocks because of their larger customer
banking activity (settling payment on behalf of other banks) which they cannot predict
as well as their own payment activity. While losses disclosed are an imperfect measure
of realized solvency issues since some banks were prompter at reporting losses than other
banks, deterioration implied by market measures (equity and CDS changes) should incor-
porate better public information available on the nancial condition of a bank, including
anticipation of losses and not just realized losses. Finally, fall in retail deposits relative to
15We exclude break1
t for the interaction eect as there is only one month between that break and break2
t
and thus little statistical power for its identication.
15assets accounts for the fact that while some banks were directly threatened by the melt-
down of the ABCP market, they were rendered especially fragile if they also experienced
a ight of retail deposits to safer banks.16
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of these variables. There is signicant variability
across banks in the measures of bank health and funding risk. About 50 per cent of the
banks in our sample did not report any losses as of March 2008, but all did between then
and end of our sample period (with an average of 6% write-os relative to assets). Equity
and CDS prices experienced dramatic swings over the sample period for many banks.
While CDS spreads increased 20 basis points (bps) on average, the maximum widening
was as high as 200 bps. Similarly, while average equity price decline was small, the worst
decline was over 70%. And while some banks gained retail deposits relative to assets (a
fall in the assets to deposits ratio), others experienced signicant losses17.
The overall results for estimation of the benchmark specication are reported in Table
4. The results in columns (1) through (7) suggest that following events unfolding since 9
August 2007, banks (especially riskier banks) hoarded liquidity.
Column (1) shows that the settlement banks react to an (expected) increase in pay-
ment value on day t by holding more liquidity at the start of the day. Controlling for the
aggregate payment value a decline in the aggregate payment volume, i.e., an increase in
the average payment size, also causes settlement banks to hold larger buers at the start
of the day. Interestingly, column (2) shows that the relationship between settlement bank
liquidity demand and payment value is signicant statistically only during the crisis, that
is, following September 11th 2007 (break2
t), the rst MPC date after the onset of the cri-
sis. In other words, reserves held by settlement banks rose with higher value of payment
activity, during the crisis but not before. While there is a response in settlement bank
liquidity to more payment transactions even before the crisis, the response is magnied
following break2
t. The p-values of the total eects of payment activity on liquidity demand
in each phase of the crisis (reported at the bottom of Panel A) vary around 1 per cent
statistical signicance. Further, the relationship is economically meaningful: a one per-
centage change in the value of payment activity post September 11th 2007 is associated
with a 2.59 percent of a standard deviation increase in the liquidity buer of settlement
banks relative to pre-crisis average.
In columns (3) through (6), we nd that higher bank risk is associated with increased
liquidity demand during the crisis. Higher losses (measured by write-os, equity price
16A classic example of this was the run on Northern Rock in September 2007. Shin (2009) provides
descriptive statistics showing that Northern Rock's problems stemmed from its high leverage coupled
with reliance on institutional investors for short-term funding. An analysis of the structure of its balance
sheet pre- and post-run shows that the rst and most damaging run on the bank took place in its short-
and medium-term wholesale liabilities, but that once its problems materialized, it also experienced a
retail run, mainly through electronic deposit accounts.
17The summary statistics reported are for the whole sample period. The top 5% of the distribution of
losses gives an idea of how the variables look like during the crisis.
16decline, and widening of CDS spreads) and higher funding risk (captured by the top 4
settlement bank dummy) are both associated with higher demand for liquidity during the
crisis, with the widening of CDS spreads showing the eect on liquidity only following
break3
t (13th March 2008). In terms of magnitude, the four largest settlement banks
increased their buer by an additional 29 percent of a standard deviation (relative to pre-
crisis levels) compared to smaller banks (column 3). Unlike the other risk metrics, declines
in retail deposits are not associated with a statistically signicant change in liquidity
demand (column 7) during the crisis, even though the coecients have the expected
positive sign.
Figures 5 and 6 depict this eect graphically. They show a dramatic rise in liquidity
demand among high risk banks relative to low risk banks as the crisis unfolds, the risk
measures being respectively whether the bank is a top four settlement bank or has above
median rise in assets to retail deposits during the crisis. The gures look similar with
other risk measures. Note that in the gures, we focus on revisions to reserves targets
by settlement banks in the two groups on MPC dates. Changes in these target are pure
variation in demand since banks choose their reserves target. The gures underscore
results of Table 4 Panel A that high risk banks revised their reserves targets soon after
inception of the crisis in August/September 2007, whereas low risk banks did so only in
2008 (and less strongly at that).
4.2 Heterogeneity in the Precautionary Reaction of Banks
We complement this benchmark analysis with a specication that allows for further het-
erogeneity in the precautionary behavior of banks. We do this by interacting bank risk
characteristics with payment activity. We split the sample in high risk and low risk banks
using the median of the risk metrics as threshold (except in the case of top four settlement
bank classication where the partition is simply top banks and others).
The estimation results are reported in Table 5 Panel A and conrm a more pronounced
precautionary reaction to payment activity (especially, in terms of payment value) among
banks with troubled balance-sheet conditions. It is easier to gauge the signicance of
the results by looking at Panel B which reports the p-values for the signicance of the
total eects in each phase of the crisis and p-values for the signicance of the dierence
in coecients between high risk banks and low risk banks. We see that the relationship
between aggregate payment activity and liquidity demand is stronger during the crisis
and more so for weaker banks. Importantly, the dierence between high risk and low risk
banks is signicant statistically when risk is measured by write-os, widening of the CDS
premium, and loss of retail deposits.
To sum up, the ndings in this section conrm our hypothesis that the increase in the
settlement bank liquidity witnessed during the crisis was (at least in part) precautionary.
During the crisis banks hoarded liquidity against payment risks, but not so pre-crisis.
17Further, this precautionary reaction was unequal across banks, being more pronounced
at weaker banks and banks characterized by greater balance-sheet funding risk.
5 Eect of Liquidity Hoarding on Money Market Rates
In the second half of the paper, we explore what were the consequences of the increase
in hoarding of liquidity by settlement banks for inter-bank markets. In particular, we
document how movements in liquidity demand by banks altered inter-bank rates before
and during the crisis.
5.1 Revised \Arbitrage" Condition in Stressed Money Markets
Theoretically, banks set reserves targets to equal the marginal cost and the marginal
benet of holding one additional unit of reserves. In normal times, the cost of nding
alternative sources of funding and even using the central bank's emergency standing facil-
ities to meet liquidity needs is low due to the absence of stigma. Then, reserves averaging
over a maintenance period ensures that market interest rates do not diverge materially
from the policy rate. This money-market \arbitrage eect" works as follows. Suppose
that overnight market interest rates are higher on a particular day than the policy rate.
Then a bank can run down its reserves balance in order to lend in the market, expecting
to be able to borrow more cheaply in the market in order to hold higher reserves balance
on subsequent days. By contrast, if market rates are lower than the policy rate, then a
bank can borrow in the market in order to build up its reserves balance.
Typically, the eectiveness of this arbitrage mechanism is aected by the width of
the range of reserves allowed by the monetary policy implementation. It is also aected
by the willingness of banks to take reserves close to the edge of their ranges given that
unexpected late payment ows could leave them needing to use a standing facility at the
end of the day. In stressed funding conditions, however, the diculty of raising wholesale
funding and stigmatization of the standing facility is high. This can curb active liquidity
management by banks in the form of arbitraging deviations in money market rates from
the policy rate. In essence, there are limits to the arbitrage (as argued in the context of
broader nancial markets by Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
With such limits to arbitrage, the incentive for banks now is to hold larger reserves
over the maintenance period to reduce the risk of having to use the standing facilities
to meet unexpected late payment shocks. The private benet of holding one additional
unit of reserves is high and hence banks charge a high liquidity premium to release their
reserves. In other words, in stressed conditions banks release their excess precautionary
liquidity only if the return on liquidity exceeds the high private benet, causing interbank
rates to be higher. We call this the \liquidity" eect.
18In our empirical work, we aim to identify both these eects: rst, the \arbitrage" eect
that exogenous increases in settlement bank liquidity would drive inter-bank rates toward
the policy rate, and the \liquidity" eect that endogenous (in our case, precautionary)
increases in settlement bank liquidity would drive inter-bank rates above the policy rate.
5.2 An Instrumental Variables Approach
To isolate the exogenous and endogenous components of settlement bank liquidity, we once
again exploit variations in payment activity. Section 2.1 highlighted mechanisms whereby
aggregate payment activity correlates with the settlement banks' overnight liquidity and
Section 4.1 provided supporting empirical evidence. We take advantage of this relationship
in our econometric approach.
Formally, we specify bank liquidity on day t (measured at the start of the day) lt as
an autoregressive process of order one:
lt = lt 1 + Pt + "
l
t ; (2)
where the precautionary demand for liquidity is captured by the dependence of lt on Pt,
the payment activity on day t (assuming banks are able to make a reasonable forecast of
the aggregate payment activity). Then, equation (2) can be rewritten as:
lt = 
2lt 2 + Pt 1 + Pt + "
l
t : (3)
Note that such an autoregressive structure would be natural when a bank chooses reserves
subject to a target it committed to at the previous target-setting day.18 Thus, within a
maintenance period, bank liquidity at time t is a function of all the past history of payment
activity.
Next, we hypothesize that the interbank market rate rt as a linear function of both
settlement bank liquidity lt and payment activity Pt :
rt = lt + Pt + "
r
t : (5)
That the market rate on a given day is a direct function of the payment activity on
that day follows from Furne (2000). The argument goes as follows. Payment ows on
any given day are positively correlated with reserves balance uncertainty. As uncertainty
generates a precautionary demand for reserves, days with higher payment ows are asso-
ciated with upward pressure on the market rate. In other words, on busier days, banks
18Specically, a bank's liquidity demand can be modeled as:




+ Pt + "l
t; (4)
where l is the reserves target of the bank. Then, up to a constant (the reserves target), bank liquidity lt
follows an autoregressive structure as proposed.
19desire to hold a larger cushion of reserves to protect against penalties for overnight over-
drafts. In equilibrium, this generates a positive relationship between payments activity
and the market rate.
If this Furne (2000) argument holds Pt is not a valid instrumental variable for lt; in
studying the eect of liquidity lt on interbank rate rt. However, because Pt is a white
noise process (based on evidence presented in Section 4.1 and Figure 4), Pt 1 is potentially
a valid instrument for lt: In other words, inter-bank rates on a given day depend on the
liquidity reserves of settlement banks on that day (measured at 5 am), which we naturally
assume includes a component of reserves adjusted to previous day's payment activity (the
instrument) and a component adjusted in anticipation of today's payment uncertainty
(the endogenous component).
The use of this instrument also helps address another issue, that of omitted variable
bias. It is plausible that during the crisis period, there were day to day uctuations in
counterparty risk in the inter-bank markets. Such risk would simultaneously raise inter-
bank rates and generate a precautionary demand for liquidity at banks. Since payment
activity Pt is a white noise process, Pt 1 is uncorrelated with counterparty risk on day
t which is more likely to determine, or be a function of, Pt. Thus, instrumenting bank
liquidity lt with Pt 1 also helps isolate the eect of liquidity on inter-bank rate rt which
is unrelated to a counterparty risk factor.
5.3 Estimating the Liquidity Eect
5.3.1 Regression Specication
The specication we estimate to link settlement bank liquidity to market-wide inter-bank






























where Yt is a vector of two variables: the secured and the unsecured inter-bank rate spread
to the policy rate (in bps). All other variables are as in specication (1). The system
is estimated using three-stage-least squares (3SLS) employing lagged payment activity as
an instrument.19 We also report results of estimation using the ordinary least squares
(OLS) for sake of comparison.
19Three stage least squares is a combination of multivariate seemingly-unrelated regressions (SURE)
and two stage least squares. It obtains instrumental variable estimates, also taking into account the
covariances across equation disturbances. If the error terms of the dierent equations are correlated
across equations, then joint estimation of the equations is able to exploit this cross equations correlation
to obtain more ecient estimates.
20Our hypothesis is that in the pre-crisis period, the eect of settlement bank liquidity
on inter-bank rate spreads is negative (the arbitrage eect) whereas during the crisis
period, the eect is positive (the liquidity eect).
5.3.2 Money Markets Data
To estimate this specication, we use daily market-wide interest rates data from the
British Bankers' Association and Wholesale Markets Brokers' Association. The secured
rate is the Gilt Collateral (GC) rate. The unsecured overnight rate is the SONIA rate.20
Table 6 reports descriptive statistics of the rates data as well as overall volumes (which we
analyze at market-wide and at bank level in case of unsecured volumes in the Appendix).
The secured rate spread to the policy rate is 6.25bps on average with a large standard
deviation of 12.65bps, whereas the unsecured rate spread to the policy rate is 11.47bps
with a variability of 13.31bps. Figure 2 shows that sharp movements in the overnight
rate spreads, especially in August and September 2007 (rising in the 50 to 100 bps range)
and again in March 2008 (rising up to 30 to 35 bps), have coincided with negative market
news, e.g., loss announcements and bailouts (see the timeline of news in Table 2).21
It might seem a puzzling observation in that the secured rate has increased more than
the unsecured rate, even if by a small margin. Note that a deterioration in the quality
of collateral pledged cannot be an explanation for why secured rates have increased more
from before crisis to during the crisis, compared to unsecured rates, because we focus on
the UK Gilt rate where quality of collateral was close to unquestionable (at least until
the Lehman bankruptcy). In secured transactions banks can also manage risk by varying
haircuts. Available data however show that for transactions secured by government bonds
haircuts have barely moved during the crisis (see Allen and Carletti (2008) Table 1 and
Bank for International Settlements (2010) Table 1). Coincidentally, Table 6 shows that in
terms of aggregates, both the secured volume and the unsecured volume have increased
post-August 9th 2007, but the increase has also been more than twice larger for secured
lending (45% against 13%). Hence, one possibility for the greater rise in the secured
spread is heightened market segmentation during the crisis, that is, dierent sets of banks
borrowing in the two markets. We entertain this possibility in the Appendix where we
analyze unsecured volumes in overnight inter-bank markets.
20SONIA stands for Sterling Over Night Index Average. It tracks actual Sterling overnight funding
rates experienced by market participants.
21We explain in Section 6 that an \uncovered" OMO caused a peak in overnight rates in the last week
of June 2007. As a result of this peak in the pre-crisis period, the unsecured rate spread is on average
unchanged from before the crisis to the crisis period, and the secured rate spread is too only 2.41 bps
higher during the crisis than pre-crisis.
215.3.3 Eect of Liquidity Hoarding on Rates
The results of estimating specication (6) are reported in Table 7 where the dependent
variable is either the secured or the unsecured rate spread to policy rate (in bps). In
the set of columns labeled (1) and (2), we report OLS estimates, and in (3) and (4) the
3SLS estimates. Set of columns (1) and (3) employ log of total settlement bank overnight
liquidity, whereas in (2) and (4), we measure the total liquidity of settlement banks in
percentage deviation from their aggregate target. The rst measure would reect changes
in liquidity from one maintenance period to another also due to revision in targets (which
induce central bank injections or draw downs of reserves), whereas the second measure
focuses exclusively on deviations from these targets (that is, uctuations that are unmet
by central bank injections).
Consider rst the OLS results. We nd that for both secured and unsecured rates,
while before the crisis a higher level of liquidity held by settlement banks is associated
with a signicant decline in overnight spreads (the arbitrage eect), during the crisis the
incremental eect is positive (the liquidity eect), starting with break2
t (13th September
2007). The total eect of liquidity on rate spreads during the crisis is in fact not sta-
tistically signicant, as shown in tests at bottom of the table. The OLS specication,
however, suers from potential endogeneity and omitted variable biases discussed above.
Next, Table 7 shows that in terms of our instrument (lagged payment activity), for
all 3SLS specications the over-identication test lead to non-rejection of the instrument.
The instruments are also strong predictors of liquidity demand with the F-statistics at
the rst stage being largely above 10, ruling out issues of weak instrumentation. More
substantively, we nd that all the OLS eects are qualitatively present in the 3SLS spec-
ications too, but the magnitude of both arbitrage and liquidity eects is about three
times as large (comparing (1) and (3) for log of overnight liquidity) or four to six times
as large (comparing (2) and (4) for percentage deviation of reserves from targets). This
eect, combined with statistical signicance of the instrument, suggest that lagged pay-
ment activity indeed helps isolate the eect of bank liquidity on inter-bank rates that is
not driven by common factors such as counterparty risk concerns.
In terms of economic magnitude (column (1)), a 10 per cent pre-crisis increase in
the overnight liquidity buer is associated with a 5.53 bps decline in the secured spread;
post-crisis, however, there is a correction of 6.89 bps in the direction of an increase in the
secured spread. It is important to note that our estimates of the liquidity eect tend to be
of similar magnitude for the secured rate and the unsecured rate, and in fact somewhat
stronger for the secured rate. The reason is that activity in the unsecured market is
concentrated among the settlement banks. As highlighted in Section 2 settlement banks
participate in the unsecured market to manage the liquidity needs that arise from their
daily payment activity. It follows that the unsecured rate is the rate at which settlement
banks borrow. Relating settlement bank liquidity and the unsecured (settlement bank
22borrowing) rate therefore is a weak test of the market-wide externality created by hoarding
behavior at settlement banks.
Interestingly, there is no signicant incremental eect post 13th March 2008. The
coecient on OLiqt  break3
t is not signicant statistically nor robust in its sign and
relatively small in magnitude. We conjecture that apart from the two weeks following the
Bear Stearns collapse, further stress in inter-bank markets was contained for the period
going from end-March to the end of our sample period (June 2008). In particular, on April
21st 2008, the BoE introduced the special liquidity scheme to deal with the overhang of
assets on bank balance sheets, allowing banks and building societies to swap for up to
three years some of their illiquid assets for liquid Gilts. The introduction of this scheme
might have gone some way towards calming the inter-bank markets but (as our results
show) did not reverse the liquidity eect that initiated in September 2007.
These results conrm our hypotheses: in stressed conditions banks release their (pre-
cautionary) excess liquidity only at a liquidity premium that exceeds the cost of alterna-
tives, such as the direct cost of using the standing facility, the indirect stigma cost, and
costs of liquidating assets or raising wholesale nance in illiquid and frozen markets. In
other words, when the rise in liquidity of settlement banks is a precautionary response
to heightened risks and funding concerns, banks require to be compensated more for re-
leasing liquidity to others. Overall, we interpret our ndings { especially the fact that
the nature and the magnitude of arbitrage and liquidity eects on inter-bank rates are
similar for secured and unsecured inter-bank lending { to imply that Sterling money mar-
kets experienced stress during the crisis not necessarily (or just) due to counterparty risk
concerns of lending banks about borrowing banks. Instead, the ndings suggest that the
stress was (also) due to banks engaging in precautionary liquidity hoarding due to their
own credit risk and adverse funding conditions. Such hoarding raised the lending rates
charged in secured as well as unsecured inter-bank markets.
5.4 Contagion Eect
We showed so far that the regime shifts in settlement bank liquidity can be explained by
a precautionary reaction at weaker banks. We also showed that the rise in this liquidity
raised average interbank rates during the crisis. This latter eect could be due to counter-
party risk, that is, due to a rise in the borrowing cost of weaker banks, and/or due to the
liquidity eect, that is, due to a rise in the lending rates of weaker banks. We employed
an instrument to get around the counterparty risk eect, but so far only employed the
average inter-bank rate. In our nal test, we try to separate these two eects using the
liquidity response of an individual bank and its contagious eect of causing interbank
rates to rise for all other banks (borrowing from it).




s  OLiqit + 
s  OLiqi t + "
s
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23where Spread is the (transaction-value weighted) unsecured spread to policy rate paid
on overnight borrowing by bank i on day t. Note that only unsecured market data are
available at bank level (extracted from CHAPS, the large value payment system, using the
algorithm of Furne, 2000). OLiqit is the overnight liquidity held by bank i; and OLiqi t
is the aggregate overnight liquidity held by all banks other than bank i. Descriptive
statistics of the main variables used in the analysis are reported in the second half of
Table 6. Note that the bank-level unsecured rate spread is clearly more variable than
the average or market-wide rate spread. The mean spread is also lower for our bank-
level spread data and this is because the bank-level analysis is conned to the ten large
settlement banks, whereas the market-wide spread is based on inter-bank borrowing for
a much larger set of nancial players. Also, as before, the quantity variables (liquidity
and payment activity) are normalized due to large dierences in size across banks, as the
number of standard deviation changes from the mean, both calculated over the rst 12
months of our sample period.
We estimate the equation using OLS and also by 2SLS using Pit 1(own payment
activity) and Pi t 1 (aggregate payment activity of all other banks) as instruments for
OLiqit and OLiqi t, where P is a vector of lagged payment activity measures (volume and
value). We thus have four instrumental variables for two endogenous variables. We also
estimate the specication where  and  are interacted with the two break dummies. The
instrumental variables are interacted similarly. The contagion hypothesis requires that
each bank's borrowing rate depends (positively) on the precautionary liquidity of other
banks ( > 0), and more so following the crisis.
In Table 8, we report estimates of the contagion eect. Columns (1) and (2) we show
the OLS estimates whereas in (3) and (4) we report the 2SLS estimates along with the
Hansen-Sargan test of over-identication. The dependent variable is the bank borrowing
spread to policy rate (in bps). We use two alternative measures of liquidity demand:
(1) abnormal variations from pre-crisis levels (columns 1 and 3); and (2) liquidity in
percentage deviation from the target to isolate demand that is not (yet) met by the
central bank (columns 2 and 4).
In all columns, the estimates show that the rate at which a bank borrows varies
signicantly with the liquidity held by other banks in the system but not with its own
endowment. Further, there is a signicant dierence between pre-crisis and crisis times.
While pre-crisis, increase in liquidity with other banks causes a bank's borrowing rate to
go down, in crisis, as other banks in the system hoard liquidity for precautionary reasons,
the bank's borrowing rate goes up. The dierential crisis eect is statistically signicant in
columns (1), (2) and (4), but not in (3), even though the signs are consistent throughout.
As in Table 7, the 2SLS eects for both arbitrage and liquidity channels are stronger than
the ones identied in the OLS.22
22Note that coecients on the current payment activity conrm that higher payment uncertainty causes
signicant rises in interbank rates, as we postulated earlier (equation 5).
24To investigate whether counterparty risk played a substantial role in aecting bank
borrowing rates during our sample period, we augment specication (7) with interactions
of bank's own liquidity and other banks' liquidity with dummies for high risk and low risk
groups (as employed in Table 5). The results are reported for 2SLS estimations in Table
9 Panel A for the borrowing spread with liquidity demand measured as deviations from
the pre-crisis levels (we report just one measure for sake of parsimony).
As in Table 8, the contagion eect is statistically and economically signicant: A
bank's borrowing spread is signicantly altered by the total liquidity of other banks (neg-
ative arbitrage eect pre-crisis and an incremental and positive liquidity eect post-crisis,
and statistically signicantly so when risk groupings are based on top settlement banks,
equity price declines and retail deposit losses), but is overall independent of the bank's
own liquidity buer. Interestingly though, these eects are virtually identical between
high risk and low risk banks. Panel B reports p-values for the signicance of the eects
in each phase of the crisis and for the signicance of the dierence in coecients be-
tween high and low risk banks. The contagion eects compared between the high risk
and the low risk groups (HR = LR tests) are by and large never rejected at conventional
signicance levels.
To summarize, our analysis shows signicant evidence for one sucient condition for
contagion in the form of an individual bank's borrowing cost being determined by other
banks' liquidity. Since the eects are present both pre- and during crisis, the critical
determinant of whether there is signicant contagion or not is whether there is a signicant
rise in bank liquidity hoardings. The latter was the case since the inception of the crisis
as we documented in Table 4.
6 Robustness to Calendar Eects and Policy Changes
In this section, we rst consider robustness of our results to augmenting our baseline
specications with calendar eects and policy changes. We note at the outset that in our
view, the policy reforms to the monetary policy framework were not natural experiments
but were in fact endogenous to economic variables of interest, such as, bank liquidity
and inter-bank rates. Thus, controlling for the timing of adjustments to the monetary
policy framework in our analysis is at one level, taking the conservative position that
these reforms were fully supply driven rather than demand driven, but at another level,
raises the caution that any results be interpreted with a grain of salt since in the process
we are introducing endogenous actions of the central bank as explanatory variables.
An important event in Sterling money markets prior to the onset of the crisis was the
so-called \uncovered" OMO. In an OMO, counterparties bid for a quantity at a xed BoE
Rate. This xed-rate bidding has one potential undesirable consequence that given the
amount of reserves each counterparty actually desires, the size of their bid is determined
by their expectation (or guess) as to how much other counterparties will bid for. That can
25set up a dynamic where, from week to week, the extent to which a short-term repo OMO
is \covered" (that is, reserves required by banks to meet their targets are supplied through
the OMO) is on a rising or falling trend. If, for example, a counterparty thinks its peers
will bid for much more than they in fact desire, then it too must do the same in order to be
allotted roughly what it actually wants. If the cover ratio is on a declining dynamic, that
can potentially lead eventually to an \uncovered" OMO, as happened in June 2007, before
the turmoil, which means that reserves were eventually undersupplied and interbank rates
went up dramatically due to lack of reserves relative to banks' targets. The Money Market
Liaison Group at BoE thought that the reaction to the uncovered OMO in end of June
2007 may have reected some money market participants not fully appreciating how the
Bank's sterling monetary framework was supposed to work.23
From the standpoint of our analysis, the uncovered OMO raises the issue that any
dierential eect we observe pre- and during the crisis might be due to this June/July
2007 episode, which precedes the most interesting period of our analysis (August 2007
onward). We will check robustness of our results by controlling for the uncovered OMO
episode through a dummy variable.
Also, there were important adjustments made to the monetary policy framework in
the UK during the period of the crisis giving leeway for banks to build up larger liquidity
buers. We describe them below and also control for them in some of our analysis to
understand which policy changes coincided with important demand shifts. By and large,
all of the changes were a response to stress in inter-bank markets and thus should be
viewed as endogenous, rather than being \natural experiments."
(1) On September 13th and 18th 2007, the BoE oered an extra (i.e. above aggregate
target) $4.4bn(each time) in its regular weekly open market operations, amounting to
25% of the aggregate reserves target for the current maintenance period. This was ac-
commodated by an increase in the reserves band around target from 1% to 37.5%. These
actions were taken to help oset the disturbance to conditions in the short-term money
markets following the announcement of lender of last resort assistance to Northern Rock
on September 14th 2007. In particular, it was a recognition that reserves banks might
need extra reserves over and above their announced targets at beginning of the current
maintenance period.
(2) The BoE further announced on 19th September 2007 that in order to alleviate
strains in longer-maturity money markets it would conduct auctions to provide funds at 3
month maturity against a wider range of collateral (including mortgage collateral) than in
the BoE's weekly open market operations. While this change may have indirectly aected
bank demand for liquidity, it does not directly aect our analysis as we focus on overnight
inter-bank markets.
(3) For the maintenance period beginning on October 4th 2007, the ranges around
23Bindseil, Nyborg and Strebulaev (2004, 2009) discuss how repo auctions at the European Central
Bank, which were also xed-rate tenders, experienced uncovered operations in early 2000's.
26reserves banks' targets within which reserves are remunerated were widened from +/-1%
to +/-30%. The target ranges remained at this level until July 10th 2008 when they were
reduced to +/-20%. Further, in view of the increase in the reserves targets set by reserves
scheme members and the potential for future increase, with eect from the maintenance
period starting on May 8th 2008, the BoE more than doubled the reserves target ceiling
it sets for each reserves scheme member. Both of these changes allowed banks to respond
more to perceived risks through their reserves balances at the BoE.
(4) On April 21st 2008, the BoE introduced the special liquidity scheme to deal with
the overhang of existing assets on banks' balance sheets. The scheme allows banks and
building societies to swap for up to three years some of their illiquid assets for liquid
Treasury Bills. In other words, the purpose of the Scheme is to nance part of the
overhang of currently illiquid assets by exchanging them temporarily with more easily
tradable assets. The banks can then use these assets to nance themselves more normally.
All of the banks and building societies that are eligible to sign up for the standing deposit
and lending facilities within the Bank's Sterling Monetary Framework are able to take
part in the Scheme. It was widely perceived that like the Federal Reserve's Primary Dealer
Credit Facility (PDCF) in the United States, this liquidity scheme played a signicant
role in temporarily easing concerns of funding against illiquid collateral.
We examine the robustness of our results by controlling for policy variables in Tables
4 and 5 (precautionary demand for liquidity in the aggregate and in the cross-section of
banks, respectively) and Table 7 (arbitrage versus liquidity eect of precautionary liquidity
on inter-bank rates). In Table 10 Panel A, we augment specication (1) with variables Zt
that include a full set of dummies to control for exogenous calendar eects: (1) A dummy
for days in the last week of June 2007 when the uncovered OMO occurred; (2) A dummy
that takes value one on days when the regular weekly open market operations take place
(every Thursday); and (3) Maintenance days' xed eects to control for regular within
maintenance patterns in liquidity holdings. In Table 10 Panel B we further augment
specication (1) with: (4) Dummies marking two periods when alternative adjustments
to the monetary policy framework were in place: (a) the widening of bands around target
between October 5th 2007 and May 1st 2008, and (b) the higher ceiling set on reserves
targets from May 2nd 2008 onwards, including which helps control for shifts that one-
time adjustments to the monetary policy framework might have caused on the aggregate
liquidity; and, (5) A dummy for days when the BoE injected liquidity in excess of the
aggregate target chosen by banks: 13 September 2007 to 3 October 2007 and 17 March
2008 to 9 April 2008.
In Panel A we nd in columns (1){(7) the total eects during the crisis remain sig-
nicant at the ve percent to one percent level (as shown by p-values at the bottom).
As before, the precautionary liquidity reaction of an individual bank to uctuations in
payment activity is signicant during the crisis but not before the crisis. In Panel B,
controlling for policy changes does not have a substantial eect on the total eects (in
27particular after break3, i.e., 13th March 2008); the precautionary liquidity reaction of
banks to uctuations in payment activity remains strong during crisis and insignicant
before crisis. And the eect during crisis (+2 and +2+3) is statistically signicantly
dierent from the pre-crisis eect (). In particular, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
 6=  + 2 + 3 at the 5 per cent level (test not reported). Importantly, in both panels
the coecients capturing the sensitivity of liquidity demand to bank risk characteristics
remain strong. During the crisis, weaker banks and banks exposed to greater payment
uncertainty exhibit substantially greater overnight liquidity even controlling for various
policy changes, and in particular, not just across reserves maintenance periods but also
within maintenance periods.
It is also instructive to study the coecients on policy variables. First, it is noteworthy
that the introduction of a higher ceiling set on reserves target is associated with settlement
banks increasing their liquidity buer by 40% to 50% of a standard deviation relative to
pre-crisis average. It was made possible by the central bank for banks to maintain higher
reserves and they did so. Second, excess (above aggregate target) supplies of liquidity by
the central bank are associated with a substantial increase in the stock of liquidity held
by settlement banks. Third, the widening of the bands around target gave banks greater
exibility to manage the liquidity needs arising from their daily payment activity. This
too coincided with settlement banks raising their liquidity though the eect is not robust
in terms of statistical signicance. Finally, the eect of the uncovered OMO dummy is
negative, but not statistically signicant.
In Table 10 Panel C, we augment specication of equation (6) with calendar eects
and policy variables Zt described above. Controlling in addition for maintenance period
xed eects is an alternative way of capturing variations in liquidity demand that are not
met by the central bank. We only report the 3SLS results. The broad conclusion is that
statistical signicance of both the arbitrage eect (negative coecient on settlement bank
liquidity in explaining inter-bank rates in the pre-crisis period) and the liquidity eect
(positive coecient for incremental eect in the post-crisis period) remains strong when
the dependent variable is the secured rate (the market-wide rate), and their magnitudes
are similar when compared to sets of columns (3) and (4) in Table 7.
7 Related Literature
Our paper cuts across a number of dierent strands of literature, in particular, on (i)
reasons why rms hoard cash, (ii) the function played by inter-bank markets and the
reasons why they may experience stress, (iii) the micro-structure of inter-bank markets
in terms of reserves requirements by central banks and the monetary policy, (iv) the
transmission of bank-level stress as contagion in the nancial sector.
The fact that the onset of the sub-prime crisis led banks to hoard liquidity for pre-
caution against funding risk nds parallel in the corporate nance literature on nancial
28constraints. In this literature (see, for example, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004,
and the references therein), when rms cannot pledge a sucient portion of their future
cash ows in capital markets, they attempt to hedge by managing cash. The result is
reduced contemporaneous investments. Large banks in the payments system settle a large
volume of transactions on a daily basis and when the volume becomes large or uncertain,
they hold extra liquidity simply to be able to eect these transactions smoothly. If their
access to external nancing dries up, this theory predicts them to hoard more cash.
The rationale for banks to hoard liquidity against aggregate nancing shocks has also
been modeled in several papers. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) argue that in the presence
of aggregate liquidity shocks asset sales cannot provide sucient liquidity for an ecient
functioning of markets. Allen and Gale (2000) build a model of co-insurance against
uncertain liquidity shocks through bank cross-holdings. Coinsurance works well against
idiosyncratic shocks: banks with surpluses provide liquidity to banks with shortages. How-
ever the whole liquidity of the banking system is bounded by the aggregate liquid assets
in the banks' portfolio. Hence while the cross-holdings work perfectly in normal times and
help reallocate liquidity across banks, they cannot create additional liquidity. Diamond
and Rajan (2001) develop a model where a bank failure can spread to the whole system
through a reduction in the common pool of available liquidity. In Allen, Carletti and
Gale (2008) liquidity hoarding by banks is driven by an increase in aggregate uncertainty
which causes banks to stop using the interbank market to trade with each other. The
banks hoard liquidity because they may need it to meet high aggregate demand.
The theory of inter-bank markets generally agrees on its role as being one of liquidity
insurance and peer monitoring. The reasons why these markets may fail sometimes or
experience severe stress dier across studies. Allen, Carletti and Gale (2008) and Freixas,
Martin and Skeie (2008) focus on incompleteness of contracting on liquidity shocks; Bhat-
tacharyya and Gale (1987), Flannery (1996), Bhattacharyya and Fulghieri (1994), Freixas
and Jorge (2007), and Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2008) focus on asymmetric infor-
mation and/or counterparty risk and related ineciencies; nally, Acharya, Gromb and
Yorulmazer (2008) focus on issues arising due to market power and strategic behavior of
liquidity-surplus banks.
While we do not study bilateral inter-bank market data required to investigate strate-
gic behavior, our ndings suggest that the stress in inter-markets witnessed during the
sub-prime crisis is unlikely to have been due (entirely) to counterparty risk concerns.
We nd almost identical eects in the Sterling money markets for overnight lending in
secured as well as unsecured transactions. While our results on transmission of an indi-
vidual bank's funding risk, and its precautionary hoardings, to other banks do not nd
a direct parallel in the literature, this form of contagion is similar in its overall spirit to
that considered in models of aggregate liquidity shortages. These include models due to
Freixas and Rochet (1996), Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000),
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Diamond and Rajan (2005), and Acharya (2009)
29wherein banks are reliant on a common pool of liquidity and one bank's adversity reduces
the available pool for others due to re sales of assets, deadweight losses from bad assets,
or drawdowns of inter-bank deposits.24
Our paper also relates to the small literature exploring the microstructure of inter-bank
markets. Hamilton (1997) studies the role of bank liquidity in aecting the federal funds
rate by employing as an instrument the \errors" in the Federal Reserve forecasts of the
eect of its operations on bank reserves. While we control for open market operations in
our tests, we rely on the extent of payments activity as an instrument. On this front, our
approach is similar to that of Furne (2000) who calibrates a model as well as empirically
demonstrates that daily fed funds rate variability is linked to that of payment ows, and
that higher payment ows lead to greater precautionary reserves which put an upward
pressure on the funds rate. We take a step further in using lagged payment ows as an
instrument to isolate the eect of that component of reserves on interest rates that arises
as a precaution against unobserved funding risk faced by banks in capital or inter-bank
markets. Fecht, Nyborg and Rocholl (2010) study the German banks' behavior in ECB's
repo auctions during June 2000 to December 2001, a period of high global corporate
default rates even if not a banking crisis. They examine the eect of bank-specic and
market-wide factors on prices that banks pay for liquidity, measured as their borrowing
rates in repos with the ECB, and nd (as we do) that the rate a bank pays for liquidity
depends on other banks' liquidity and not just its own.
Ashcraft and Due (2007) also provide evidence consistent with precautionary target-
ing of reserves balances maintained by banks at the Federal Reserve and the role played
by \arbitrage" activity of banks using their reserves in ensuring that overconcentration
of reserves does not arise in some banks. The authors hint at the possibility that pre-
cautionary targeting of reserves by banks, anticipating the heightened risk of hoarding by
other banks, can lead to a \gridlock", high interest rates and systemic risk, on days when
some large institutions end up with high reserves (by chance or by design). It is possible
that precautionary hoardings we identify capture such a phenomenon, but the fact that
they increase in our data for weaker banks leads us to conclude that they are potentially
also a response to funding needs during adverse conditions.25
Finally, Ashcraft, McAndres and Skeie (2010) provide a theoretical model and em-
pirical evidence for the Federal Funds market showing that banks hold excess reserves
intra-day as well as overnight, are reluctant to lend, and intra-day fed funds rate becomes
highly volatile due to precautionary behavior of banks in response to heightened payment
24Theoretical analysis wherein precautionary hoardings of aected banks are explicitly modeled and
shown to raise the cost of borrowing for healthier banks giving rise to an interest-rate contagion may be
worthy of pursuit in future (see Acharya and Skeie, 2010, for some early work along these dimensions).
25In contrast to the crisis of 2007-2009, Furne (2002) nds that the inter-bank markets functioned
remarkably well in transferring liquidity in the banking system during the Autumn of 1998 when Long
Term Capital Management's problems surfaced.
30uncertainty (during the crisis of 2007-08). These results corroborate our ndings for the
UK inter-bank markets. Our bank-level ndings shed further light by explaining that the
precautionary response is mainly due to weaker banks but its eects are felt by all banks.
8 Conclusion
By examining the eect of a full-blown nancial crisis (starting August 2007) on liquidity
demand of large settlement banks, and its eect on interbank market rates, we uncovered
an important precautionary demand channel that caused stress in the Sterling money
markets. The economics underlying these eects suggest that the channel was likely to
be at work in other countries too since they had their fair share of weakened nancial
institutions. Perhaps most interestingly, our results showed that there can be a contagion-
style systemic risk in inter-bank markets whereby increase in the precautionary demand
of liquidity by some adversely aected banks leads to a rise in costs of borrowing liquidity
for all other banks.
There are several important avenues for future work. Within the aggregate setting,
the substitution of liquidity demand between term (3-month) and overnight borrowing
seems an intriguing issue to investigate. Further, our study focused on identifying the
precautionary motive for liquidity. An additional channel { the \strategic" one { may
also be at work. There are two aspects to this channel. One is the strategic behavior
in terms of market power of some large players in the interbank markets (as suggested
theoretically by Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer, 2008, and supported empirically by
Fecht, Nyborg and Rocholl, 2010). This would require bilateral analysis of interbank
markets and relationships. The second is the strategic behavior due to adversely aected
banks not disclosing their losses early enough and delaying asset sales (Diamond and
Rajan, 2009), and safer banks hoarding cash with the motive to acquire these assets at
deep discounts in future (Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer, 2007 and Diamond and Rajan,
2009). It is our prior that this kind of strategic eect was prevalent after the failure of
Lehman Brothers when the returns on various kind of assets and strategies rose sky-high
and an overall freeze resulted in the global nancial system. This too remains a feasible
exercise in a bilateral analysis of interbank markets.
Finally, volatility in inter-bank rates can also induce volatility in bank lending rates to
the real economy, which is worthy of investigation as an additional spillover eect due the
liquidity hoarding by weaker banks. In some unreported tests for only ve UK banks, we
nd that the monthly household and corporate lending rates (xed and oating) as well
as lending volumes respond to the variability in inter-bank rates. Overall, as inter-bank
rate faced by a bank rises, its lending rates to households and corporates rise and volumes
shrink, and the eect exists mostly during the crisis but not before.26
26Descriptive evidence in the BoE Credit Conditions Survey in 2007 Q4 show that lenders had revised
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34Figure 1. Total settlement bank liquidity (overnight plus intraday) and key market
events
Note: The overnight liquidity is the sum of the reserves accounts of all 10 UK settlement
banks balances measured at 5 am each day. The intraday liquidity is the maximum
collateralized intraday-credit that can be obtained from the central bank each day. The
structural breaks (broken line) were estimated using the Bai-Perron algorithm for
multiple breaks.
01-05 October: Citigroup, Merill Lynch and UBS announce large losses
14 September: Emergency lending facility toNorthern Rock
05 October: Bank of Englandwidens bands aroundreserves target from 1% to 30%
14 March: Bear Stearns rescue
Mid-December tomid-February: Large loss announcements
by RBS, UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch and Credit Suisse
29 July: IKB announces 10 bn euro exposure
09 August: BNP suspends calculation of the net asset valueof three
money market funds exposed to subprime and halts redemption
13 August: Goldman Sachs injects 3 bn USD intoits statistical arbitrage fund
after 30% loss
17 August: Sachsen LB receives 17.3 bn euro bail-out
03 May: UBS closes distressed hedge fund
14 June: Bear Stearns quarterly earnings fall by a third
22 June: Bear Stearns injects 3.2 bn USD tobailt out structuredcredit fund










































































































































































ln(Overnight + Intraday Liquidity in billion pounds)
Structural breaksFigure 2. Overnight money market spreads (basis points) and key market events
Note: The data are daily and cover the whole market. The secured rate is the Gilt
Collateral (GC) rate. The unsecured overnight rate is the Sterling Overnight Index
Average (SONIA) rate.
14 March: Bear Stearns distress
Mid-December tomid-February: Large loss announcements
by UBS, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse, and Citigroup
14 September: Northern Rock receives emergency
lending facility
28 June open market operation
uncovered
09 August: BNP suspends calculation of the net asset value
of three money market funds and halts redemption
13 August: Goldman Sachs injects 3 bn USD intoits statistical
arbitrage fund after 30% loss






































































































































































Secured rate spread to policy rate (basis points)
Unsecured rate spread to policy rate (basis points)Figure 3. Overnight liquidity held by settlement banks and their aggregate target
Note: The overnight liquidity is the sum of the reserves accounts of all settlement banks
balances measured at 5 am each day. Under the current monetary policy framework UK
settlement banks choose a reserves target which they are required to achieve on
average within maintenance period. They reset their reserves targets at the start of




































































































































































Aggregate reserves target £bn
Settlement banks' sum of reserves balances (overnight liquidity) £bnPanel A. Value
Panel B. Volume
Figure 4. CHAPS payments activity (logarithm)
Note: Payment activity (value and volume) is the sum of all transactions that flow
through CHAPS, the UK large-value payment system (real-time-gross settlement
system operated by the Bank of England). Both the aggregate value and the aggregate


































































































































































































































































































































































































8Figure 5. Reserves target of high risk (top 4 settlement banks in terms of payment
activity) and low risk (other) settlement banks in billion pounds
Note: The frequency is one maintenance period. The data cover 10 UK settlement
banks. Under the current monetary policy framework UK settlement banks choose a
reserves target at the start of each maintenance period which they are required to



















































































































































Graphs by Top4Figure 6. Reserves target of high risk (higher than median decline in deposits)
and low risk (lower than median decline in deposits) settlement banks in billion
British pounds
Note: The threshold to categorize settlement banks into high or low risk is the median of
the (cumulative) change in total assets retail deposits ratio. See table 1 for a definition
of the equity price decline. The data cover 10 UK settlement banks (foreign banks are


















































































































































Graphs by Total Assets/Retail Deposits changeTable 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Settlement bank Liquidity, Payment Activity and Indicators of Bank Risk
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min  Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
Aggregate variables  Difference  P-value
ln( Settlement banks overnight liquidity billion £) 2.39 0.25 1.62 3.18 1.96 2.40 2.79 0.27 0.00
ln( Settlement banks total liquidity billion £) 4.12 0.13 3.82 4.36 3.91 4.15 4.30 0.24 0.00
ln(Payment volume/1000) 4.91 0.21 4.51 5.64 4.67 4.84 5.31 0.00 0.67
ln(Payment value billion £) 5.44 0.16 4.73 5.98 5.21 5.43 5.71 0.09 0.00
Total settlemnt banks overnight liquidity in % 
deviation from aggregate target 25.00 23.35 -33.90 185.57 -10.19 23.36 63.82
Variables used in bank-level regressions
Settlement bank overnight liquidity (1) 0.10 1.07 -3.32 7.76 -1.18 -0.12 2.15
Log(Aggregate Payment Value (trillion £)) 0.26 0.04 0.13 0.43 0.21 0.26 0.34
Log(Aggregate Payment Volume (million)) 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.13 0.20
Risk metrics (*)
Write-offs/Total Assets (quarterly) 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.04 0.16
Cumulative change in Total Assets/Retail Deposits 
(monthly)  -0.32 4.38 -28.39 17.71 -1.85 0.00 1.55
Equity Price Decline % (2) -0.64 28.21 -69.71 70.92 -60.046 -0.395 45.005
Cumulative change in CDS premium (basis points) 26.65 29.57 -1.12 199.85 -0.50 18.37 82.79
(1) Normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation both calculated over the first 12 sample months. 
(2) Cumulative from 2006 mean. The source is Bloomberg. 
(*) In the analysis all risk metrics are lagged by one period. 
(pre-August 9th) - 
(post August 9th)
The data are from the Bank of England statistics division (when not specified otherwise) and most cover the period 02/01/07 to 30/06/08. Settlement (First-Tier) banks are 
the ten UK banks that settle their payments activity directly at the central bank. Overnight liquidity is the sum of the reserves accounts balances of those ten UK settlement 
banks measured at 5 am each day. The total liquidity includes the overnight and the intraday liquidity. The intraday liquidity is the maximum collateralized intraday-credit that 
banks can obtained from the central bank each day. Payment activity (value and volume) is the sum of all transactions that flow through CHAPS, the UK large-value payment 
system ( real-time-gross settlement system operated by the Bank of England). Both the aggregate value and the aggregate volume of payments are net of interbank loans 
activity. Equity price data are from Bloomberg and credit default swap (CDS) premiums from MarkIT. We use the 5-years MR senior tranche premium. Table 2. Bai-Perron Multiple Level Break Tests on Settlement Bank Liquidity
Panel 2a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Overnight Liquidity+Intraday Liquidity)
Break Dates 95 % Interval  Estimates Key Market News Date
1/2/2007 3.937*** Sample Starts
(0.007) Early Phase
3/27/2007 [27/02/07;19/04/07] 4.009*** UBS to close Dillon Read hedge fund unit. The unit suffers large losses in US-sub prime  03 May 2007
(0.006) Bear stearns announces quarterly earnings fall by a third as trading revenues were impacted by   14 June 2007
8/8/2007 [30/07/07;09/08/07] 4.213*** problems in the US mortgage market. Fixed income sales and trading revenue fall by 21 per cent. 
(0.004) Bear Stearns provides 3.2 bn dollars financing to bail out structured credit fund  22 June 2007
Cheyne's Queenswalk fund announces 68 million dollars losses 25 June 2007
UDmax SupLRt(2/1) SupLRt(3/2) IKB announces surprise 10 billion € exposure to US sub-prime mortgages through it ABCP-funded vehicles  30 July 2007
234.469*** 23.425*** 8.535
Main Phase
BNP Paribas suspends the calculation of the net asset value of  three money market funds exposed to 
sub-prime and halts redemption  09 August 2007
Goldman Sachs injects $3bn ($2bn of its own capital) into its statistical arbitrage fund 13 August 2007
Sachsen LB receives a €17.3bn bailout by German state  17 August 2007
Bank of England announces emergency lending facility to Northern Rock 14 September 2007
Bank of England supplies additional reserves to the banking system +25% (one week maturity) 13 September 2007
UBS says it would make write downs of $3.4bn to its fixed income portfolio 01 October 2007
Citigroup says Q3 earnings will fall 60% on a year ago 01 October 2007
Merrill Lynch announces it will make a loss in Q3 due to a $5.5bn write-down  05 October 2007
Merrill Lynch reports write-downs of $7.9 bn on sub-prime mortgages and asset-backed securities 24 October 2007
Morgan Stanley announces a $3.7bn loss on sub-prime structured credit 08 November 2007
Rumours of a $10bn write-down by Barclays relating to securities backed by sub-prime mortgages 09 November 2007
Panel 2b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Overnight Liquidity)
Break Dates 95 % Interval  Estimates Timeline of Events (continued)
1/2/2007 2.236*** Bank of America's CEO pre-announces writedowns of $3bn in Q4. 13 November 2007
(0.015) Bear Stearns announces an expected write down of $1.2bn in Q4 14 November 2007
9/11/2007 [23/08/07;18/09/07] 2.474*** Freddia Mac announces a Q3 loss of $2bn 20 November 2007
(0.017) UBS announces further write downs of $10bn (dated to end November) 10 December 2007
3/13/2008 [04/03/08;08/04/08] 2.629*** Bank of America announces it may have to record more than its initial $3.3 billion losses and write-downs 12 December 2007
(0.023) Citigroup announces it is to raise at least $14.5 billion in new capital 15 January 2008
Merrill Lynch reports $ 10.3 billion loss 17 January 2008
Ambac announces Q4 net loss of $3.225 billion 22 January 2008
XL capital Ltd expects Q4 net loss of up to $1.2 billion 23 January 2008
UDmax SupLRt(2/1) SupLRt(3/2) Credit Suisse announces additional $2.85 billion losses 19 February 2008
112.673*** 17.392*** 8.936 JP Morgan agrees to provide secured lending to Bear Stearns  14 March 2008
JP Morgan agrees to purchase Bear Stearns for $2 per share 16 March 2008
Fed gives primary dealers effective access to the discount window through a new credit facility 16 March 2008
HBOS equity price falls sharply on rumours of liquidity problems. HBOS denies any problem.  19 March 2008
Note: (***) stands for significant at the 1 per cent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Liquidity is measured as the sum of reserves accounts held at the central bank. 
The Bai and Perron (1998) sequential algorithm is used to estimate the timing of (lasting) level shifts in the settlemnt bank liquidity series (overnight and total). This method applies an algorithm that 
searches all possible sets of breaks and determines for each number of breaks the set that produces the maximum goodness-of-fit. The WD max is used to investigate if at least one break is present. If 
there is evidence for one break the method continues to add breaks until the supLRT(l+1/l) test fails to reject the hypothesis of no additional structural changes at the 5% level or there is no room for more 
breaks. We allow for heterogeneous and autocorrelated errors as outlined in Bai and Perron (2003). The trimming parameter is set to 15%. This implies a minimal window length of about 2 months. The test 
results are reported in this table together with a timeline of relevant events put together using Bloomberg. See Table 1 for a definition of the intraday and overnight liquidity.Table 3. Calendar Effects on the Aggregate level of Payments Activity
OLS (1) OLS (2)
Calendar Dummies  ln(Payments Value) ln(Payments Volume)
United Kingdom Holidays [-1;+1] 0.073* 0.115**
(0.039) (0.048)
United States Holidays [0] -0.575*** -0.146***
(0.032) (0.024)
First 5 days of the month 0.002 0.044**
(0.018) (0.018)






Thursday  -0.059*** 0.036**
(0.019) (0.017)
Friday  -0.002 0.347***
(0.021) (0.017)
Quarter 1 0.081 0.044
(0.064) (0.052)
Quarter 2 0.035 -0.019
(0.06) (0.048)
Quarter 3 0.138 0.030
(0.107) (0.074)




Portmanteau Test for White Noise 0.29 0.12
at Lag-1 P-value 
R-squared 0.38 0.75
Number of Observ. 376 376
Note: The portmenteau test is run on the residuals from regressions that exclude the constant term.
Monday is the omitted day.
This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of a regression of the aggregate log 
payments value and volume on various calendar effects.  UK holidays is a dummy taking value one 
on days immediately preceeding and following bank holidays; US holidays takes value one on US 
holidays and so on so forth. "Quarter 1" takes value one on each day of the last week of the first 
quarter and so on so forth.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (*), (**), (***) indicates 
significance at 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively. The results indicate that 
up to 75 per cent of the variation in payment activity can be explained by few calendar dummies.Table 4. Evidence on Settlement Banks' Precautionary Liquidity Reaction during the Crisis









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Payment value)(t)  3.547*** -0.059 -0.057 -0.069 -0.554 -1.068 0.119
[0.529] [0.810] [0.808] [0.808] [0.949] [1.158] [0.904]
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break2  2.590** 2.589** 2.414** 2.717** 4.541*** 2.841**
[1.054] [1.052] [1.049] [1.263] [1.564] [1.179]
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break3  1.119 1.114 1.037 0.867 -1.302 2.037*
[1.088] [1.085] [1.078] [1.437] [1.740] [1.223]
ln(Payment volume)(t) -5.629*** -3.549*** -3.549*** -3.537*** -2.191** -2.801*** -3.578***
[0.624] [0.807] [0.805] [0.805] [0.944] [0.972] [0.898]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break2 -2.120* -2.122* -1.972* -2.067 -2.497* -2.725**
[1.169] [1.166] [1.162] [1.410] [1.453] [1.306]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break3 0.483 0.490 0.355 0.465 1.758 -0.176
[1.275] [1.272] [1.261] [1.672] [1.607] [1.436]
Risk  0.052 0.275 -0.014*** 0.005 -0.018*
[0.081] [0.504] [0.002] [0.007] [0.010]
Risk*Break2 0.291*** 1.312*** 0.013*** -0.007 0.010
[0.065] [0.499] [0.002] [0.007] [0.014]
Risk*Break3 0.074 1.516* 0.001 0.004** 0.008
[0.063] [0.854] [0.001] [0.002] [0.007]
Break1 0.221*** 0.222*** 0.230*** 0.297*** 0.099 0.228***
[0.060] [0.060] [0.060] [0.075] [0.146] [0.067]
Break2 -0.247 -0.364 -0.298 -0.16 -0.558 -0.125
[0.251] [0.252] [0.252] [0.301] [0.365] [0.281]
Break3 -0.312 -0.342 -0.337 -0.201 -0.025 -0.455*
[0.238] [0.239] [0.237] [0.318] [0.370] [0.268]
Constant  0.111 0.437** 0.381** 0.483*** -0.149 0.696*** 0.360*
[0.130] [0.184] [0.184] [0.184] [0.234] [0.245] [0.207]
Tests p-values X=ln(Payment value) 
X+X*Break2=0 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.018 0.002 0.001
X+X*Break2+X*Break3=0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.025 0.194 0.000
Tests p-values X=ln(Payment volume) 
X+X*Break2=0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
X+X*Break2+X*Break3=0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.017 0.000
Risk+Risk*Break2=0 0.000 0.001 0.487 0.292 0.250
Risk+Risk*Break2+Risk*Break3=0 0.000 0.002 0.991 0.078 0.907
R-squared 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.10
Bank fixed effects x x x x x x x
Number Observ. 3780 3780 3780 3780 2582 2368 3016
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
This table reports estimates of equation (1). We express an individual bank demand for liquidity as a function of the aggregate level of payment activity and balance sheet 
measures of its credit and liquidity risk, allowing for a shift in this relationship during the crisis. See Table 1 for a definition of liquidity and payment activity. Overnight liquidity is 
normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation both calculated over the first 12 sample months. We use four alternative risk metrics described in 
table 1. The regressions are run on data covering the 10 UK settlement banks in the period January 2 2007 to June 30 2008. Here we report the results for the overnight 
liquidity as it is our main focus.  Break1 takes value one from 08/08/07 onwards; Break2 takes value one post 11/09/07; and Break3 takes value one post 13/03/2008. We 
report robust standard errors in brackets. Table 5. Precautionary Liquidity Reaction to Fluctuations in Payment Activity and Bank Risk 
Dependent variable: Individual settlement bank overnight liquidity 
Panel A. Estimation results





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Payment value)(t)*HR   -1.479 0.747 -1.238 -1.346 0.007
[1.103] [0.924] [1.049] [1.265] [0.989]
ln(Payment value)(t)*LR  0.89 -0.854 0.305 -0.504 0.384
[0.950] [0.924] [1.122] [1.265] [1.086]
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break2*HR  4.486*** 3.067** 4.004*** 5.359*** 3.403**
[1.293] [1.210] [1.415] [1.736] [1.343]
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break2*LR  1.323 2.110* 1.053 3.550** 2.046
[1.164] [1.210] [1.524] [1.736] [1.398]
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break3*HR  0.47 0.648 -0.200 0.097 3.180**
[1.356] [1.255] [1.618] [1.900] [1.439]
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break3*LR  1.545 1.550 2.320 -2.151 0.971
[1.213] [1.255] [1.732] [1.900] [1.439]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*HR -0.616 -4.507*** -2.258* -2.474* -3.031***
[1.258] [1.125] [1.237] [1.356] [1.151]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*LR -5.504*** -2.588** -2.220 -3.224** -4.301***
[1.031] [1.125] [1.424] [1.356] [1.388]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break2*HR -4.423** -3.270** -3.094* -3.649* -3.118*
[1.833] [1.631] [1.855] [2.031] [1.789]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break2*LR -0.588 -0.991 -0.394 -0.916 -2.143
[1.499] [1.631] [2.136] [2.031] [1.908]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break3*HR 2.061 1.455 1.761 -0.942 -2.57
[2.010] [1.774] [2.222] [2.249] [2.038]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break3*LR -0.559 -0.429 -1.529 3.789* 2.185
[1.641] [1.774] [2.492] [2.249] [2.038]
Break1 0.221*** 0.224*** 0.237*** 0.233*** 0.237***
[0.060] [0.059] [0.072] [0.076] [0.067]
Break2 -0.247 -0.248 -0.266 -0.754** -0.085
[0.251] [0.250] [0.299] [0.349] [0.281]
Break3 -0.312 -0.314 -0.210 0.125 -0.472*
[0.237] [0.234] [0.314] [0.366] [0.269]
Constant 0.386* 0.423** 0.541** 0.559** 0.349*
[0.234] [0.186] [0.214] [0.243] [0.205]
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.10
Bank fixed effect x x x x x
Number Observ. 3780 3780 2589 2368 3016
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
In this table we report estimates of equation (1) extended to allow the slope of the liquidity reaction to aggregate payment fluctuations to depend on whether the bank 
is classified as high risk (HR) or low risk (LR). Bank risk is measured by the same indicators as in Table 4 using the median as threshold. Except in column (1) where 
the dummy takes value one if the bank is one of the top 4 clearers in terms of payment activity. The sample covers the 10 UK settlement banks in the period January 2 
2007 to June 20 2008. We report robust standard errors in brackets, pvalues for the significance of the total effect in each phase of the crisis, and pvalues for the 
statistical difference between HR and LR banks (null hypotheses are listed). See Table 1 for a definition of the dependent and explanatory variables. See Table 4 for a 
definition of the Break points. Note that the dummy variables HR*Break, LR*Break, HR, LR are perfectly collinear with the Break dummies and bank fixed effects. Panel B. Significance of Total Effects 
Tests p-values X=ln(Payment value) 
X*HR =X*LR 0.059 0.077 0.140 0.440 0.707
(1): X*HR+X*HR*Break2=0  0.007 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.001
(2): X*LR+X*LR*Break2=0  0.018 0.165 0.232 0.018 0.018
HR=LR: (1)=(2) 0.550 0.012 0.248 0.438 0.377
(3): (1)+X*HR*Break3=0  0.013 0.000 0.093 0.023 0.000
(4): (2)+X*LR*Break3=0  0.002 0.021 0.024 0.623 0.013
HR=LR: (3)=(4) 0.855 0.189 0.486 0.041 0.024
Tests p-values X=ln(Payment volume) 
X*HR =X*LR 0.002 0.227 0.986 0.692 0.477
(1): X*HR+X*HR*Break2=0  0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2): X*LR+X*LR*Break2=0  0.000 0.008 0.135 0.012 0.000
HR=LR: (1)=(2) 0.581 0.030 0.240 0.394 0.890
(3): (1)+X*HR*Break3=0  0.132 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.000
(4): (2)+X*LR*Break3=0  0.000 0.021 0.075 0.865 0.025
0.131 0.329 0.850 0.021 0.097
HR=LR: (3)=(4)Table 6. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: Money Markets Rates 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min  Max 5th percentile 50th percentile 95th percentile
Difference  P-value
Aggregate variables
Secured overnight rate % 5.47 0.31 5.03 6.66 5.06 5.47 5.89 0.06 0.00
Unsecured overnight rate % 5.52 0.32 5.04 6.75 5.08 5.52 5.94 0.05 0.13
Secured overnight rate spread to policy rate (basis 
points) 6.25 12.65 -14.17 108.33 -3.88 4.50 17.50 2.41 0.05
Unsecured overnight rate spread to policy rate (basis 
points) 11.47 13.31 -9.37 125.38 3.98 9.38 29.22 -0.66 0.61
ln(Secured overnight volume billion £) 1.77 0.44 0.19 2.77 1.03 1.76 2.46 0.45 0.00
ln(Unsecured overnight volume billion £) 3.12 0.16 2.58 3.59 2.85 3.12 3.39 0.13 0.00
Bank level variables 
Unsecured borrowing spread to policy rate (basis 
points) 4.43 11.21 -210.00 201.00 -5.00 3.29 17.42
Own overnight liquidity (1) 0.00 1.00 -3.55 6.49 -1.22 -0.21 1.90
Others overnight liquidity (1) 2.39 0.39 -0.68 3.27 -1.59 0.15 1.15
Own overnight liquidity in % deviation from target  3.72 34.21 -100.00 273.00 -51.33 3.15 56.49
Others overnight liquidity in % deviation from target  -74.17 5.30 -106.18 -58.40 -80.95 -73.43 -67.66
(1) Normalized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation both calculated over the first 12 sample months. 
(pre-August 9th) - 
(post August 9th)
Aggregate (meaning covering the entire markets) interest rates and volume data are from the British Bankers'Association and t he Wholesale Markets Brokers' 
Association. The secured rate is the Gilt Collateral (GC) rate. The unsecured overnight rate is the Sterling Overnight Index  Average (SONIA) rate.  The data are daily, 
when not specified otherwise, and cover the period 02/01/2007 to 30/06/2008. Bank-level unsecured market data are from the Bank of England extracted from the 
payments database using the Furfine algorithm. Repo volume data are from the monthly balance sheet reports collected by the B ank of England statistics division.  See 
Table 1 for a definition of liquidity. Table 7. The Impact of Settlement Banks Precautionary Liquidity Hoarding on Overnight  Money Market Spreads
Dependent variables: Whole market secured and unsecured rates spread to policy rate






spread secured spread unsecured spread
Liquidity  -19.262*** -21.104*** -0.140*** -0.135*** -55.329*** -60.967*** -0.656** -0.732**
[5.470] [5.670] [0.043] [0.044] [18.255] [20.506] [0.268] [0.303]
Liquidity*Break2  26.686*** 28.114*** 0.182*** 0.181*** 68.930*** 58.714** 0.788** 0.725*
[7.619] [7.897] [0.058] [0.061] [25.533] [28.681] [0.327] [0.370]
Liquidity*Break3  -13.48 -1.539 -0.134* 0.014 -18.609 37.798 -0.236 0.149
[11.353] [11.768] [0.070] [0.073] [46.046] [51.722] [0.272] [0.307]
Break2 -83.801*** -90.529*** -21.648*** -24.960*** -185.589*** -161.271** -33.657*** -35.655***
[19.480] [20.191] [2.968] [3.093] [64.380] [72.316] [8.133] [9.197]
Break3 37.456 3.971 4.430* 0.271 51.161 -102.835 7.191 -2.772
[31.002] [32.134] [2.401] [2.502] [125.506] [140.977] [6.518] [7.370]
Break1 17.897*** 18.027*** 17.126*** 17.214*** 16.259*** 16.652*** 13.169*** 13.217***
[2.573] [2.667] [2.573] [2.681] [2.676] [3.006] [3.299] [3.730]
Constant 51.372*** 62.885*** 8.528*** 15.459*** 137.810*** 158.586*** 21.530*** 30.701***
[13.256] [13.740] [1.474] [1.536] [44.053] [49.484] [7.118] [8.049]
Tests p-values X=Liquidity 
X+X*Break2=0 0.162 0.202 0.292 0.269 0.446 0.911 0.483 0.974
X+X*Break2+X*Break3=0 0.546 0.599 0.110 0.313 0.906 0.456 0.598 0.521
Hansen-Sargan 
Overidentification statistic= 16.877 9.250
P-value= (0.154) (0.682)
Number Observ. 376 376 375 375 296 296 295 295
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
OLS 3SLS
Liquidity=ln(Total settlement bank 
reserves balances)
Liquidity=Total settlement bank  





Liquidity=Total settlement bank  
reserves balances in % deviation 
from aggregate target
(1) (2)
We report ordinary least squares (OLS) and three stage least squares (3SLS) estimates of the liquidity effect on overnight secured and unsecured rates. All spreads are in basis points. See Table 4 for 
a definition of the Break points. The 3SLS model is in calendar days time rather than in working days time i.e. Mondays are excluded to avoid the distortion from Friday being both a day of particularly 
high payments activity and the day following the regular weekly open market operation (OMO). The model in calendar days time is preferred because the model in working days time is not well 
identified; payments activity on day t-1 is a weak instrument for overnight liquidity holding on day t. All variables are defined in Table 6 and sources reported. The market data are aggregate (i.e. cover 
the entire market) daily data for the period January 2 2007 to June 30 2008. Liquidity is the liquidity help by the ten first-tier UK settlement bank. We report in brackets robust standard errors. Pvalues for 
the significance of total effects in each phase of the crisis also reported. Table 8. Settlement banks liquidity and contagion effect: bank level analysis 
Dependent variable: Unsecured borrowing rate spread to policy rate (in basis points) 
Using abnormal variations 
in liquidity 
Liquidity in % deviation 
from target 
Using abnormal 
variations in liquidity 
Liquidity in % deviation 
from target 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own liquidity  -0.528 -0.003 -0.383 0.244
[0.329] [0.010] [5.767] [0.167]
Others liquidity  -10.916*** -0.026* -49.413*** -0.467**
[1.589] [0.013] [18.563] [0.208]
Own liquidity *Break2  1.031 0.64 23.313 14.179
[0.607] [0.477] [21.247] [18.061]
Others liquidity*Break2  12.261*** 3.978*** 21.755 -15.967
[1.297] [0.974] [21.279] [20.022]
Own liquidity *Break3  -0.844 -0.883 -16.309 -0.32
[0.550] [0.566] [19.806] [24.589]
Others liquidity*Break3  0.891 -1.04 15.203 1.15
[1.246] [1.178] [21.627] [23.857]
Break1 12.606*** 12.290*** 12.208*** 8.059***
[1.068] [1.142] [1.710] [2.561]
Break2 -1.146 -26.428*** -64.909 24.718
[2.967] [2.944] [50.940] [49.119]
Break3 -45.474*** 3.195 -39.734 -15.691
[3.278] [2.863] [51.942] [56.334]
ln(Payment value)(t) 18.500*** 18.017*** 18.100*** 17.190***
[1.350] [1.369] [5.296] [4.957]
ln(Payment volume)(t) -1.489** 1.414** -10.321* 2.669
[0.518] [0.528] [5.529] [3.159]
Bank fixed effect x x x x
X=Own liquidity 
X+X*Break2=0 0.324 0.214 0.223 0.425
X+X*Break2+X*Break3=0 0.370 0.529 0.326 0.343
X=Others liquidity 
X+X*Break2=0 0.249 0.003 0.193 0.414
X+X*Break2+X*Break3=0 0.000 0.000 0.127 0.307
Hansen-Sargan 
Overidentification statistic= 7.265 5.259
P-value= 0.297 0.511
Number Observ. 3421 3411 2677 2667
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
OLS 2SLS
In this table we report estimates of the liquidity effect using bank-level data.  We let the spread paid by a bank depend on both its 
own liquidity and the liquidity held by other banks in the system.  The sample covers  the 10 UK banks in the period January 2 
2007 to June 30 2008. We report  robust standard errors in brackets and pvalues for the statistical  significance of the total effects 
in each phase of the crisis in parentheses. Significant effects are highlighted in  bold.  We report  OLS and 2SLS estimates using 
lagged payment  activity (own and others, value and volumes) as instruments, in total four instruments for two endogenous 
variables.  And control for current aggregate payment activity. Table 9. Contagion effects by risk type
Dependent variable: Overnight settlement bank unsecured borrowing spread 
Panel A. Estimation results 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Own Overnight liquidity*HR  -6.058 5.902 -20.168* -15.137 -10.393**
[4.182] [6.648] [11.152] [11.634] [4.375]
Own Overnight liquidity*LR  4.724 -16.692 10.204 1.595 1.928
[7.114] [11.557] [12.166] [7.017] [7.275]
Own Overnight liquidity*HR*Break2  11.359 4.311 23.519* 49.793 9.509
[7.682] [15.694] [13.917] [41.046] [7.107]
Own Overnight liquidity*LR*Break2  10.252 29.404** -0.700 -4.989 12.538
[10.993] [14.673] [12.348] [15.992] [19.479]
Own Overnight liquidity*HR*Break3  0.938 2.978 2.781 -33.363 4.655
[5.657] [17.387] [5.084] [38.719] [7.903]
Own Overnight liquidity*LR*Break3  -14.907 -10.043 -11.206 2.236 14.565
[9.795] [11.212] [6.816] [16.395] [50.524]
Others Overnight liquidity*HR -39.193*** -28.935 -35.674** -25.648 -49.121***
[13.431] [18.225] [17.846] [20.527] [17.144]
Others Overnight liquidity*LR -45.978*** -26.998 -33.104* -24.934 -48.946***
[14.470] [18.719] [17.681] [20.838] [17.375]
Others Overnight liquidity*HR*Break2 29.273** 15.994 30.391** 19.284 43.389***
[12.035] [18.887] [14.633] [22.088] [13.924]
Others Overnight liquidity*LR*Break2 28.384** 17.317 25.868* 21.286 40.030***
[11.828] [18.148] [13.975] [22.043] [13.542]
Others Overnight liquidity*HR*Break3 11.748 -1.499 7.379 5.450 -2.593
[10.130] [12.669] [10.520] [19.783] [19.107]
Others Overnight liquidity*LR*Break3 11.249 -0.991 8.584 3.548 -2.963
[10.061] [12.056] [10.605] [20.166] [23.717]
Break1 12.230*** 11.800*** 13.425*** 12.938*** 12.212***
[1.681] [1.684] [2.287] [1.864] [1.925]
Break2 -81.838*** -52.661 -80.357** -63.450 -111.727***
[28.402] [44.206] [34.099] [53.082] [31.671]
Break3 -29.243 0.480 -18.092 -9.438 5.209
[24.862] [29.109] [26.027] [47.973] [49.634]
ln(Payment value)(t) 18.499*** 17.123*** 21.058*** 13.595* 17.085***
[3.833] [4.357] [5.107] [7.343] [6.148]
ln(Payment volume)(t) -8.348** -6.219 -9.404* -3.536 -9.432
[4.181] [4.585] [5.609] [6.575] [5.943]
Bank fixed effect x x x x x
Hansen-Sargan statistic= 13.772 8.386 10.836 15.846 12.720
P-value= 0.316 0.754 0.543 0.198 0.390
Number Observ. 2677 2677 1927 2215 2127
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
In this table we report estimates of the liquidity effect using bank-level data and letting the estimates vary between high risk (HR) and low 
risk (LR) banks.  See Table 5 for a definition of risk types. And Table 4  for a definition of the Break points. In this specification we allow the 
spread paid and charged by a bank to depend on both its own liquidity and the liquidity held by other banks in the system.  The sample 
covers the 10 UK banks in the period January 2 2007 to June 30 2008. We report robust standard errors in brackets, pvalues for the 
statistical significance of the total effects in each phase of the crisis, and pvalues for the statistical significance of the difference between 
bank types.  See Tables 1 and 6 for a definition of all explanatory and dependent variables. Significant effects are highlighted in  bold.  We 
report 2SLS estimates using lagged payment  activity (own and others, value and volumes) as instruments, in total four instruments for two 
endogenous variables by bank type.  And we control for current aggregate payment activity.  Note that the dummy variables HR*Break, 
LR*Break, HR, LR are perfectly collinear with the Break dummies and bank fixed effects. Panel B. Significance of Total Effects 
Tests p-values X=Own overnight liquidity 
X*HR =X*LR 0.212 0.088 0.114 0.157 0.144
(1): X*HR+X*HR*Break2=0  0.250 0.439 0.395 0.352 0.860
(2): X*LR+X*LR*Break2=0  0.080 0.188 0.125 0.822 0.413
HR=LR: (1)=(2) 0.283 0.870 0.415 0.316 0.389
(3): (1)+X*HR*Break3=0  0.262 0.134 0.244 0.768 0.506
(4): (2)+X*LR*Break3=0  0.987 0.679 0.622 0.851 0.461
HR=LR: (3)=(4) 0.422 0.314 0.191 0.731 0.558
Tests p-values X=Others overnight liquidity 
X*HR =X*LR 0.285 0.287 0.081 0.395 0.889
(1): X*HR+X*HR*Break2=0  0.288 0.241 0.608 0.742 0.518
(2): X*LR+X*LR*Break2=0  0.093 0.322 0.486 0.853 0.357
HR=LR: (1)=(2) 0.195 0.203 0.090 0.361 0.123
(3): (1)+X*HR*Break3=0  0.706 0.074 0.518 0.866 0.557
(4): (2)+X*LR*Break3=0  0.206 0.195 0.738 0.987 0.510
HR=LR: (3)=(4) 0.235 0.092 0.603 0.544 0.416Table 10. Controlling for adjustments to the monetary policy framework
Panel A. Liquidity demand









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Payment value)(t)  3.911*** 0.194 0.195 0.149 -0.849 -1.471 0.474
[0.573] [0.896] [0.894] [0.893] [1.050] [1.362] [0.992]
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break2  1.982* 1.981* 1.797 2.393* 4.441*** 2.194*
[1.105] [1.102] [1.100] [1.319] [1.697] [1.228]
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break3  1.639 1.633 1.547 1.521 -1.111 2.582**
[1.109] [1.106] [1.097] [1.447] [1.775] [1.240]
ln(Payment volume)(t) -5.250*** -2.757*** -2.756*** -2.689*** -0.737 -1.312 -2.594**
[0.900] [1.014] [1.012] [1.013] [1.181] [1.287] [1.121]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break2 -1.632 -1.635 -1.458 -1.547 -2.013 -2.276*
[1.189] [1.186] [1.183] [1.427] [1.507] [1.321]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break3 0.036 0.044 -0.081 -0.209 1.2 -0.948
[1.295] [1.291] [1.280] [1.676] [1.619] [1.447]
Risk  0.054 0.319 -0.086*** 0.006 -0.017*
[0.081] [0.501] [0.014] [0.007] [0.010]
Risk*Break2 0.291*** 1.362*** 0.076*** -0.007 0.009
[0.064] [0.497] [0.011] [0.007] [0.014]
Risk*Break3 0.073 1.464* 0.005 0.004** 0.008
[0.064] [0.864] [0.008] [0.002] [0.007]
Break1 0.182*** 0.183*** 0.193*** 0.288*** 0.087 0.172**
[0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.077] [0.149] [0.070]
Break2 -0.125 -0.241 -0.18 -0.133 -0.579 0.025
[0.267] [0.267] [0.267] [0.318] [0.393] [0.296]
Break3 -0.385 -0.414* -0.404* -0.293 0.03 -0.490*
[0.245] [0.245] [0.243] [0.323] [0.382] [0.274]
Uncovered OMO -0.596*** -0.239 -0.239 -0.241 -0.152 -0.292 -0.25
[0.171] [0.176] [0.176] [0.176] [0.204] [0.227] [0.195]
Constant -0.157 0.336 0.218 0.051 -0.294 0.408 0.331
[0.264] [0.264] [0.300] [0.276] [0.360] [0.397] [0.290]
Tests p-values X=ln(Payment value) 
X+X*Break2=0 0.008 0.008 0.018 0.111 0.016 0.003
X+X*Break2+X*Break3=0 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.030 0.303 0.000
Tests p-values X=ln(Payment volume) 
X+X*Break2=0 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.109 0.034 0.000
X+X*Break2+X*Break3=0 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.158 0.240 0.000
Risk+Risk*Break2=0 0.000 0.005 0.246 0.334 0.244
Risk+Risk*Break2+Risk*Break3=0 0.000 0.002 0.572 0.115 0.893
R-squared 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.14
Bank fixed effects x x x x x x x
Maintenance days effects x x x x x x x
OMO days fixed effects x x x x x x x
Number Observ. 3770 3770 3770 3770 2582 2368 3016
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
See Tables 4 and 5 for details of the specification , definitions of the variables used and and sample covered. In these spec ifications we control for 
adjustements to the monetary policy framework undertaken during the crisis and calendar effects. Uncovered OMO takes value on e the last week of 
June  2007. Band-Widening takes value one in the period 05/10/2007 to 01/05/2008 i.e. after the Bank of England widened the bands around reserves 
targets. Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling takes value one from 01/05/2008 onwards i.e. after the Bank of England doubled the reserves target ceiling.
Esupply is a dummy that takes value one on days when the central bank OMO offer was in excess of the aggregate target chosen  by banks. See 
Section 2.3 for a detailed description of the reforms undertaken by the Bank of England during the crisis. Robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets. Panel B. Liquidity demand









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Payment value)(t)  1.180* -0.073 -0.072 -0.107 -1.083 -1.631 0.094
[0.608] [0.894] [0.892] [0.892] [1.047] [1.363] [0.987]
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break2  1.429 1.432 1.377 1.448 3.728** 1.339
[1.120] [1.117] [1.114] [1.342] [1.742] [1.241]
ln(Payment value)(t)*Break3  1.762 1.752 1.655 2.175 0.359 2.301*
[1.154] [1.151] [1.141] [1.516] [1.850] [1.290]
ln(Payment volume)(t) -3.585*** -2.671*** -2.670*** -2.606*** -0.706 -1.376 -2.446**
[0.894] [1.010] [1.008] [1.008] [1.176] [1.288] [1.113]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break2 -1.705 -1.712 -1.604 -1.374 -1.754 -2.232*
[1.189] [1.186] [1.183] [1.433] [1.532] [1.318]
ln(Payment volume)(t)*Break3 -0.237 -0.224 -0.310 -0.893 0.330 -1.254
[1.289] [1.285] [1.275] [1.690] [1.632] [1.446]
Risk  0.003 0.399 -0.014*** 0.005 -0.017*
[0.080] [0.506] [0.002] [0.007] [0.010]
Risk*Break2 0.291*** 1.320*** 0.013*** -0.007 0.009
[0.064] [0.499] [0.002] [0.007] [0.014]
Risk*Break3 0.074 1.351 0.001 0.003* 0.009
[0.063] [0.852] [0.001] [0.002] [0.007]
Break1 0.079 0.079 0.077 0.182** -0.055 0.152*
[0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.087] [0.154] [0.081]
Break2 -0.053 -0.171 -0.145 0.028 -0.446 0.102
[0.283] [0.284] [0.284] [0.341] [0.411] [0.314]
Break3 -0.465* -0.494* -0.486* -0.513 -0.359 -0.455
[0.262] [0.262] [0.261] [0.346] [0.420] [0.293]
Uncovered OMO -0.276 -0.207 -0.207 -0.210 -0.117 -0.268 -0.21
[0.169] [0.176] [0.175] [0.176] [0.203] [0.227] [0.194]
Band-Widening 0.251*** 0.126 0.127 0.157* 0.137 0.179 0.081
[0.037] [0.088] [0.088] [0.089] [0.108] [0.124] [0.099]
Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling  0.505*** 0.401*** 0.403*** 0.444*** 0.379** 0.451*** 0.352**
[0.057] [0.124] [0.124] [0.124] [0.159] [0.165] [0.140]
Esupply 0.562*** 0.488*** 0.489*** 0.475*** 0.562*** 0.457*** 0.609***
[0.066] [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.100] [0.114] [0.093]
Constant 0.223 0.447 0.331 0.494** 0.108 0.913** 0.177
[0.261] [0.299] [0.263] [0.251] [0.346] [0.446] [0.331]
Tests p-values X=ln(Payment value) 
X+X*Break2=0 0.112 0.110 0.136 0.718 0.113 0.129
X+X*Break2+X*Break3=0 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.085 0.195 0.004
Tests p-values X=ln(Payment volume) 
X+X*Break2=0 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.146 0.052 0.001
X+X*Break2+X*Break3=0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.093 0.124 0.000
Risk+Risk*Break2=0 0.000 0.005 0.529 0.132 0.289
Risk+Risk*Break2+Risk*Break3=0 0.000 0.002 0.875 0.623 0.854
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.14
Bank fixed effects x x x x x x x
Maintenance days effects x x x x x x x
OMO days fixed effects x x x x x x x
Number Observ. 3780 3780 3780 3780 2582 2368 3016
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.Panel C. Overnight market rates 
secured spread unsecured spread secured spread unsecured spread secured spread unsecured spread secured spread unsecured spread
Liquidity  -85.225* -74.836 -0.643* -0.571 -93.810* -86.883 -0.695 -0.654
[45.729] [47.445] [0.380] [0.394] [51.809] [54.898] [0.423] [0.453]
Liquidity*Break2  79.919** 63.620* 0.631** 0.502 83.087** 68.852 0.640* 0.528
[36.881] [38.265] [0.317] [0.329] [39.993] [42.378] [0.334] [0.358]
Liquidity*Break3  2.752 6.828 0.067 0.105 -4.710 -0.670 -0.016 0.019
[42.760] [44.365] [0.410] [0.426] [42.829] [45.383] [0.398] [0.426]
Break2 -198.178** -156.778* -11.519 -7.656 -206.158** -173.197 -10.523 -10.553
[91.015] [94.431] [14.304] [14.866] [100.571] [106.568] [15.747] [16.848]
Break3 -11.1 -13.084 -8.734 -0.906 10.022 4.908 -3.191 1.18
[118.401] [122.845] [22.006] [22.870] [113.752] [120.534] [16.303] [17.444]
Break1 22.546*** 24.512*** 22.742*** 24.709*** 22.723*** 24.773*** 22.842*** 24.904***
[6.483] [6.726] [6.821] [7.089] [6.881] [7.291] [7.141] [7.641]
Uncovered OMO 39.405** 50.731*** 41.791** 52.535*** 36.473* 46.687** 39.527** 49.047**
[17.574] [18.234] [17.951] [18.655] [19.553] [20.719] [19.678] [21.054]
Band-Widening -2.402 -1.56 -2.693 -1.795
[6.072] [6.434] [6.264] [6.702]
Higher-Reserves-Target-Ceiling  -0.206 2.006 -1.336 1.088
[9.980] [10.575] [10.550] [11.288]
Esupply 2.313 6.456 1.262 6.051
[12.098] [12.819] [13.837] [14.805]
Constant 244.976** - 18.893 38.382** 247.319* - 34.102* 42.085*
[124.047] [26.498] [18.759] [138.282] [19.505] [21.525]
Tests p-values X=Liquidity 
X+X*Break2=0 0.821 0.645 0.955 0.759 0.684 0.518 0.816 0.619
X+X*Break2+X*Break3=0 0.953 0.922 0.889 0.927 0.728 0.691 0.858 0.801
Maintenance days fixed effets x x x x x x x x
OMO days fixed effects x x x x x x x x
Maintenance period fixed effect x x x x x x x x
Hansen-Sargan Overidentification 
statistic= 11.601 11.601 12.223 12.223 9.237 9.237 10.383 10.383
P-value= (0.478) (0.478) (0.428) (0.428) (10.683) (10.683) (0.582) (0.582)
Number Observ. 295 296 295 296 296 296 295 295
Note: (*), (**), (****) stands for statistically significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level, respectively.
Liquidity=ln(aggregate reserves balances)
Liquidity=aggregate reserves balances 




Liquidity=aggregate reserves balances 
in % deviation from aggregate target
(3) (4)
See Table 7  for  details of the sample covered and definition of the variables used in the estimation. 
3SLS estimates are reported. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. 